

# COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"To those who wished to continue the war for the purpose of reducing the power of France, I wish to state, that another campaign could not have been made at a less expense than forty millions, and a perpetual annuity (except for the operation of the Sinking Fund) of two millions per annum, in addition to our other burdens. Even certain success would not have been worth such a price."—*Mr. ADDINGTON* (now Lord Sidmouth's) Speech, 3d November, 1801.

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## SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

**THE NEW MINISTRY.**—The Pittites deny that it is a *new* ministry, and, as we will not dispute with them about mere words, we will allow, that it is *Mr. Addington's ministry revived, or re-instated*; but, we never can allow, that *no change* in the ministry has taken place, and that, in the language of a Pitt newspaper of yesterday, that "Lord Sidmouth at the council board is to be considered of no more consequence as to public measures than Mr. Addington in the chair of the House of Commons." No: the Addingtons may now, surely, retort Mr. Pitt's sarcasm of the 18th of June last, and assert, that, whatever other persons may think of the matter, "the right hon. gentleman, at least, must be convinced, that a *very real, and quite sufficient change* has taken place."—In a preceding sheet (*written on Friday, the 11th instant*), it was stated, that Mr. Addington was to be created Lord Viscount *Raleigh*, which was no misstatement, that name having, at that time, been fixed on, and, it is said, at first actually inserted in the patent. This is only mentioned for the purpose of showing, that there was no *misstatement* upon the subject, either intentional or otherwise.—The Earl of Buckinghamshire (late Lord Hobart) is now, as it was then said he was to be, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and a member of the cabinet. Lord Sidmouth is the President of the Council, in the room of his grace the Duke of Portland, who retires from *office* on account of ill health, but who keeps his seat in the *cabinet*. Lord Mulgrave is Sec. of State for foreign affairs, in the room of Lord Harrowby, who retires on account of his ill health. Mr. Sergeant, late a Secretary of the Treasury, is not yet appointed to be a privy counsellor; but to that list, as already lengthened by the names of Messrs. Wallace, Bragge, Long, Tierney, Hiley Addington, Canning, and George Rose, are now added those of Messrs. Nicholas Vansittart, R. P. Carew, Sullivan, and J. Hookham Piere. "In the multitude of counsellors," says Solomon, "there is wisdom." And Blackstone, in speaking of this particular council, says: "But, the

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"principal council belonging to the king is his Privy Council, which is generally called, by way of eminence, *the council*. And this, according to Sir Edward Coke's description of it, is a *noble, honourable, and reverend assembly*."—It does not seem to be generally known, though it is said to be very certain, that the place of Secretary of State for foreign affairs is to be given up to the Marquis of Wellesley, upon his return to England, and this step or something like it appears, indeed, to have been in the contemplation of Mr. Pitt, even before he repossessed himself of the reins of power, as will be seen by a reference to Mr. Henry Wellesley's letter, which was intercepted and published by the French.\* "I believe," says the letter, "that Pitt will return to office in the course of a year. This makes me wish, that you should be on the spot, to form part of the new ministry, which would *then* be excellent, if Pitt were at the head. What do you think of it pray? You would be able to obtain every thing you wish with regard to India; and, if you thought proper, to return again as Governor General." Is this now the scheme then? By calling home the Marquis, however, Mr. Pitt secures the Directors, for the present at least, and by keeping the place of Secretary open, he secures the recalled Governor General's friends. The Marquis must, nevertheless, experience some surprise and mortification, upon finding that he is to form part of a cabinet, at the head of which is that very Mr. Addington, of whom so contemptuous mention is made in the letter here referred to, especially after all the assurances which he must have received, that the breach between Mr. Addington and Mr. Pitt was irreparable. The same letter says: "Lord Grenville (who is the organ of Canning) told me, that Pitt has *such a contempt for Addington*, that he would not, at present, act with him on any conditions whatever." What is meant by Lord Grenville being the organ of Mr. Canning, is, doubtless, that, upon this occasion, his Lordship reported to

\* Political Register, Vol. VI. p. 534.



Mr. Wellesley what he had heard from Mr. Canning; so that, either in Mr. Pitt or Mr. Canning, there must have been the grossest duplicity, or Mr. Pitt really had, in July 1803 (the date of the letter) a profound contempt for Mr. Addington; and, to Lord Wellesley, who has been, in the interim, at a distance from the scene, the present situation of Mr. Pitt must appear truly astonishing.—The public prints exclusively attached to Mr. Pitt's part of the ministry, particularly the ORACLE and the SUN, continue, almost incessantly, their efforts to persuade the public, that Lord Sidmouth and his part of the ministry are to have no weight in the deciding upon public measures; that the title bestowed on the latter is to be considered merely as a reward for services in the chair of the House of Commons, and not as prime minister, respecting Mr. Addington's conduct in which last-mentioned situation Mr. Pitt does, we are told "retain all his former opinions." Indeed! Yes, he may retain them; but there are great odds, that he will take care to keep them to himself. Neither he nor Mr. Canning will be so indiscreet as to again express them, at least not in a voice loud enough for any one to hear. Their newspapers will, perhaps, persevere in their present line of conduct; but, from the language of the THE TIMES, which is the leading print of the Addingtons, such conduct is not likely to pass with impunity as will appear from the following passages, taken from an article bearing all the marks of demi-official authority.—"If to our feelings there is any drawback from the pleasurable sensations in which we are disposed warmly to participate with the public under the present appearance of things, it arises from witnessing the persevering and diabolical malignity, with which some wretches connected even with ministerial journals, have continued their venomous but impotent efforts to sow the seeds of jealousy between the two distinguished persons, whose reconciliation has so deeply interested their countrymen at large. Our readers will perhaps recollect, that soon after it was announced, we noticed strong symptoms of this wicked propensity, which, so far from abating, has since more distinctly displayed its mischievous character, and has stamped discredit and disgrace on the publications which have suffered their pages to be soiled by these foul emanations of inventive malice, envy and selfishness. No falsehood however glaring—no imputation however gross—has been omitted by these sons of darkness, to attain the great

object of their hearts, a revival of mistrust and dissension between two friends, whose renewal of confidential intercourse has been contemplated with such true pleasure by every man of generous feeling, and by every real friend to his king and country."—"The day of their [the "sons of darkness"] success is past; misrepresentation will labour in vain to blast again the best hopes of the country. On the integrity, fair-dealing, and honor of Mr. Pitt and Lord Sidmouth, the public has, we believe, equal and unqualified reliance. The latter is to the former not a rival, but a *coadjutor* in his government; and whether as president of the council, or filling any other high office, shares the responsibility of public measures, as a member of the cabinet. At this we rejoice. We contemplate with becoming pride the state-vessel under sail, with able pilots at the helm, and manned by an efficient and united crew. *Vermin* and *insects* may cling about her sides; but will we trust, never be enabled to impede her course and obstruct her progress."—Who are here designated under the name of "vermin" it is by no means difficult to guess. The next song that Mr. Canning writes about the vessel of state, he will of course take care to talk of the *pilots* and not of the *pilot*, who weathered the storm! The Sidmouths seem resolved not to yield an inch; and notwithstanding the conciliatory hints of the COURIER, a print boisterously loud in praise of Mr. Canning, that "Lord Sidmouth and his immediate friends will have too much good sense to suffer Mr. Windham's motion to draw them into a pertinacious adherence to the wisdom of their former measures," the public will see, that concessions are to come, if at all, from the other branch of the family. The question is not, whether the Sidmouths will adhere to the wisdom of their former measures; but, whether they will, either expressly or tacitly, allow that they merited the charge of "incapacity and imbecility." On the other hand, there are, amongst the close friends of Mr. Pitt, some persons of perfect independence, of great respectability of character, and of considerable weight, who, one would think, cannot feel very pleasantly at the prospect of the approaching scenes. We can see a reason quite satisfactory for the continued adherence of Mr. Canning, Mr. Long, Mr. Robert Ward, George Rose, and the like; for that of the Claude Scotts, the Thorntons, the Smiths, the Peeles, &c. &c. we can also easily account; nor is there much difficulty in guessing at the motives of



the Wilberforces, the Lascelles, and others of that description; but it is not so easy to perceive why the Marquis of Stafford, for instance, Lord Exeter, Lord Lowther, Lord Romney, Sir Harry Mildmay, Mr. Patten, and some others, should suffer themselves to be exhibited in the majorities of an administration composed almost entirely, whether as to numbers or influence, of the same identical persons, of whose utter incapacity they appeared to be convinced only seven months ago! How highly and how justly offended would these noble and honorable persons have been, if, in the month of May last, any one had told them, that, in less than a twelvemonth, they would give their voices in support of the power of Mr. Addington! Yet, it is impossible that they should not see, and *feel*, that it really is in support of that power that they are now to stand forward. Very *forward*, indeed, they will not, in all probability, stand. It is rather to be supposed, that they will endeavour, if they resolve to adhere to Mr. Pitt, to avoid any very *prominent* situation, in which endeavour they will, in all likelihood, completely succeed!—The visit of His Majesty to Richmond Park was, long ago, correctly stated. Since that, mention has been made in several of the public papers, of a visit made by Mr. Addington (now Lord Sidmouth) to Kew. It has been asserted, that the premier went thither *unattended*; that he remained there, *tête à tête* *four hours*; and that the visit was *concealed from Mr. Pitt*. Upon this THE TIMES makes the following remarks; and the reader will bear in mind, that THE TIMES is the leading print of the Addington part of the ministry. “As to the principal facts, admitting them to be true, what then? Mr. Addington’s visit to Kew could not, we presume, have taken place, without a command from his Majesty; who would naturally be disposed to shew some *attentions* to an individual who had served him with *fidelity*, and had retired from that service *with honour*, and *without reward*:—it might even have been *natural* for a gracious King, especially under *recent circumstances*, to be anxious that some *particular mark of distinction should be conferred*. The result, however, of the best inquiries that we have been able to make, is, that this visit of four hours was scarcely of *two*; that Mr. Addington went in his carriage, *attended as usual*; and that a meeting took place between him and Mr. Pitt the very same day, or the day following, where it is at least *probable*, that a confidential communication took place between them.”

—Attentions! Attentions from a Sovereign to one of his subjects! And these are your “King’s friends” too! Observe also, that these “attentions” were “*naturally*” shown to a person, who had, it is here assumed, served the King with “*fidelity*.” And, is it so rare a thing, then, to find a man who has served his Majesty with fidelity? Lord Nelson, some people think had served him with fidelity; but, what loyal subject ever thought so meanly of the kingly office, as to presume, that royal “attentions” were due even to the hero of the Nile and of Copenhagen? This writer may, perhaps, be disposed to deny, that Mr. Pitt has served the King with “*fidelity*,” but, unless this denial be acquiesced in by the adherents of that gentleman, it will remain for them to show, that Mr. Pitt has, at some time, received similar “attentions,” unless they are ready candidly to confess, that Lord Sidmouth is the real “confidential servant” of the King. But, it seems, Mr. Addington had further claims to his Majesty’s attentions. He had not only served him with fidelity, but had “retired from that service *with honour*.” And is it meant to insinuate, then, that Mr. Pitt did *not* retire *with honour*? Again; he retired “*without reward*.” Was the Clerkship of the Pells and a slice of a royal park no hing? And did Mr. Pitt take a greater reward than that? No; but there was yet another claim to these extraordinary “attentions;” to wit: those “*recent circumstances*,” which might “*naturally*” induce “a gracious King to be anxious that some *particular mark of distinction should be conferred*.” Which “recent circumstances” were, doubtless, to be found in the turning-out of Mr. Addington; and, as that was effected through the immediate influence of Mr. Pitt, the inference, which the Addington writers wish the public to draw, is too obvious to be mistaken by even the most shallow part of that public! The reasons why Mr. Canning and George Rose, and even Mr. Pitt himself, should quietly submit to drudge along under the effects of such an inference are plain enough, and have already been stated in p. 32 of the present Volume; but, why such persons as the Marquis of Stafford, and others of the same description should so submit, it appears very difficult to explain.—From these matters of opinion let us come to the facts relating to this remarkable visit to Kew. First; as to its duration, instead of four hours, we are now informed, that it lasted only *two*. Quite long enough for a *tête à tête*; or, at least, quite long enough to satisfy Mr. Pitt, or he must be a very unreasonable



man. **SECONDLY**; we are told, that it is to be presumed, that it did not take place "*without his Majesty's command.*" Certainly we are so to presume. But, because we are to presume, that Mr. Addington would not venture to visit his Sovereign without a previous command; because we are to presume that he would not knock at the royal apartment with less ceremony than at the door of his apothecary, are we to conclude, that the visit had in it nothing which bespoke an uncommon degree of confidence on the part of the royal person visited? **THIRDLY**; Mr. Addington went in his carriage, *attended as usual.* That is to say, by his coachman and footman. And, who said he did not? Who said that he went as it were by stealth? Nobody. By the word *unattended*, was meant, however it might have been interpreted, unaccompanied, *in the presence of his Majesty* by Mr. Pitt, by any of the ministry, and even by any of the officers of state, or others usually near the person of the King. That it was, in short, that species of audience, to which none but the prime minister, or the Lord Chancellor, upon particular occasions, is seldom, if ever, admitted. **FOURTHLY**; it is insinuated, but *not asserted*, that, at a meeting, which took place between Mr. Addington and Mr. Pitt, the very next day, or the day following, the former communicated to the latter what had passed at Kew. The expressions are very vague. "It is at least *probable* that a *confidential communication* took place between them." Is that all? A confidential communication about *what*? And to what effect? The writer dared not state, that, at this meeting, Mr. Addington communicated *all*, no, nor *any part*, of what was said during the visit at Kew. Indeed, the writer wished to leave no such impression upon the mind of the public; and the truth evidently is, that, under the pretext of *correcting* the statement made by the other prints, the demi-official writer in *THE TIMES* has here taken occasion to render indubitable that, of which, before, some persons closely attached to Mr. Pitt *affected* to doubt. Of this only remaining excuse, this last disguise of their shame, the inexorable Addingtonian writers seem resolved to deprive them. Of whose triumph the reconciliation is a mark the public must easily perceive from even the friendly language of the two parts of the ministry. On the Addington side, the "reconciliation;" the cordial "reconciliation between two distinguished statesmen;" the joy which the nation must experience at "a reconciliation essentially necessary to the stability of his

"Majesty's government as well as to the "*vigorous prosecution of the arduous contest in which we are engaged.*" This is the language on the side of the Addingtons, whose prints are full of it; but, in the Pitt newspapers, you never hear any *joy* expressed upon the subject of the reconciliation. Even the *word* is carefully avoided; and the only importance *affected* to be ascribed to the event is, that Mr. Pitt will gain *fifty votes* by Mr. Addington's *coming over* to him! And here a remark occurs upon this statement of the Pittites, and that is, that, either their statement is false: either Mr. Addington does not bring *fifty votes*, or, he has very nearly as many *independent votes* attached to him as Mr. Pitt has; for, it cannot be forgotten, that, upon Mr. Pitt's amendment to Mr. Patten's motion, he was in a minority of 56. If he were *now* to place himself in a similar situation, who is there that supposes he would find *twenty* members at his back?—Some persons imagine, that the recent distribution of *blue ribbons*, added to the many other mortifications which Mr. Pitt has had, and yet has, to submit to, will induce him to resign; and, if report speaks true, the mortification relative to the blue ribbons must be, one would think, insupportable. The noblemen, upon whom the four ribbons have been bestowed, are well known to have adhered to Mr. Addington to the very last; while the Marquis of Stafford, to whom it has been positively asserted without contradiction, Mr. Pitt was pledged to give one of the ribbons, was not only well known to be opposed to Mr. Addington, but was the very person before whose threatened motion that minister thought fit to retreat from office! Mr. Pitt, it has been asserted in print, and has not been contradicted, stood engaged, in this respect, to the Marquises of Stafford and Wellesley, each of them certainly highly worthy of the honour; and, it has also been asserted, that he exerted his utmost in order to make good his engagement. That he did not *succeed* we know! The disappointment of the Marquis of Stafford (supposing the garter to have been promised him) must, however, have very little weight with him, when compared to the circumstance of his being compelled (if he adhere to Mr. Pitt) to aid in upholding the power of Lord Sidmouth. This reflection really appears to be insupportable to any man of a noble mind, and that his lordship has always shewn himself to be such a man every one is ready to allow. To support Mr. Pitt, (though all he did might not be worthy of approbation,) especially when he appeared *weak*, was not

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only excusable, but, perhaps, laudable, in Lord Stafford; but, to support him as the *coadjutor* of Lord Sidmouth! Oh! no, no! it cannot be! His real situation, then, nobody can fail to perceive. Yet, those persons, who imagine that he will resign in disgust, are very much deceived. He is come up "from Ardea," as Mr. Robert Ward says, "to restore the city and save the tottering state;" and, in order, doubtless, to accomplish this patriotic purpose, he will bear much more than one would like to say.—With respect to the choice of the new Archbishop of Canterbury, it is said, though not quite positively, that Lord Sidmouth has, upon the earnest and repeated solicitations of Mr. Pitt and some of their common friends, consented to the appointment of the Bishop of Lincoln, in lieu of the Bishop of Norwich, well-known to have been fixed on, long ago, by Mr. Addington. Of the prelates in question it is not known that his Majesty has ever expressed any particular desire to give either the preference. The appointment appears, therefore, to have been left to be settled by the two premiers; and, it is as was before observed, said, that Lord Sidmouth has finally yielded to the earnest and repeated solicitations of Mr. Pitt and some of their common friends. This is very likely to be correct; for, as Lord Sidmouth has no particular connexion with the Rutland family; as he can regard them merely as persons who voted in support of him, his insisting upon the preferment of the Bishop of Norwich, in opposition to that of the Dr. Prettyman, or, indeed, his insisting upon the preferment of any Bishop other than Dr. Prettyman, could not possibly be viewed in any other light than that of a barbarous and wanton outrage on the feelings of Mr. Pitt. Nevertheless, if even this should take place, *Mr. Pitt will not stir!* So firm appears his determination "to save the city and restore the tottering state," that if he were compelled to descend a step or two in official rank, it would not be surprising if he were still to cling on. To this length, however, it is hardly probable that Lord Sidmouth will push his triumph; because, in spite of every expectation to the contrary, such inexorable perseverance in humiliating Mr. Pitt might drive the latter out of the ministry; and, though the numbers he would carry with him would certainly be insignificant, yet, as "a debater," to use a phrase of THE TIMES, his loss could not fail to be felt. The most probable conjecture, therefore, is, that his lordship will pursue a course that shall just furnish the partisans of Mr. Pitt

with a pretext whereon to justify that gentleman's remaining in the ministry, but that shall, at the same time, fully convince the world that his lordship is in reality the First Minister of England.—In the preceding sheet, lists of the ministries of Mr. Addington and that of Lord Sidmouth were given. It was then supposed, that the Duke of Portland was to retire from the cabinet, as well as from the presidentship of the council. But, it appears that his grace is to retain a seat in the cabinet; so that, the only difference will be, that Lord St. Vincent and Mr. Yorke will be out, and in lieu of them Mr. Pitt, Lords Melville, Camden, and Mu'grave, will have come in.

COMMUNICATION FROM FRANCE. (Continued from p. 96). In resuming the remarks upon the several points of the Speech, it is proper to begin with a continuation of what has already been said respecting the Communication from France, especially as far as relates to that difference of opinion, which, upon this topic, the Pitt papers have attributed to Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox.—Lord Grenville expressed his joy at the prospect of a co-operation upon the Continent; and approved of the determination not to enter into negotiations with France, till the powers with whom we were engaged in confidential intercourse and connexion had been advised with. *Opposed* to this Mr. Fox said not one word. He said, he wished to ascertain, whether the powers described in the Speech, as engaged in confidential intercourse and connexion with us, were really our allies or not; and he took care clearly to state, that his doubt upon this subject might arise from the wording of the Speech, and not from any difference of opinion, as to the line of conduct intended to be pursued with respect to the consulting of allies or the entering into negotiations for peace. And, who, with some explanation of the phrase, would have been satisfied with the words "confidential intercourse and connexion?" Who could tell whether there were any alliance, or not? and, if there were *no alliance*, what ground was there to call upon the parliament to approve of the ministers having advised His Majesty "not to enter into any more particular explanation without previous communication with certain powers on the Continent?" Mr. Pitt gave satisfactory assurances of our having formed an alliance with Russia, though, it appears, the treaty is not yet actually signed. This was sufficient. Mr. Fox made no reply; and not one word escaped him, whence it could be inferred that there was any difference of opinion be-



tween him and Lord Grenville. Indeed, the articles, in the ministerial papers, insisting upon such a difference, really appear to have been prepared beforehand. The partisans of Mr. Pitt seem to have made sure that he had provided the means of embarrassing and confusing his opponents; and some of these discreet gentlemen have gone so far as to induce some persons to conclude, that the intended alliances with, and subsidies to, the continental powers, have for their sole object, the *humbling of the Opposition*, and preserving Mr. Pitt's place, instead of the *humbling of Napoleon*, and preserving the independence of England! This must surely be not so; but, if such be the object, it will be a great pity; because it certainly will not be effected, and the attempt will have cost us very dear. No: the opposition stands upon a basis not to be shaken by any thing that Mr. Pitt could, even in his best days, have done. There is not the least probability that any difference of opinion will arise between the leaders of opposition relative either to peace or war. Those candid writers, who are paid for the purpose, do, indeed, continue to insist, that the New Opposition, as it was called, having pledged themselves to maintain the justice and fitness of *eternal war*, can never, upon a question of this sort, be in harmony (without an abandonment of principle on one side or the other) with the Old Opposition, they having pledged themselves to maintain the justice and fitness of *eternal peace*. The conclusion here is logical enough, and all that is wanting to render the argument sound, is, *truth in the premises*. It is, indeed, true enough, that these premises were, over and over again, argued upon as admitted and notorious facts, by the makers of the peace of Amiens and their partisans; but, they were not, for all that, the less false; and, it must be remembered, that they were constantly denied by every person, to whom such wild and sweeping notions were attributed. It suited the purpose of Mr. Addington and Mr. Pitt extremely well, to inculcate a belief, that those who opposed their peace, were persons who wished for *eternal war*; and that those who objected to their so soon changing that peace into a new war, were persons who wished for *eternal peace*. Nothing would be more convenient to them than a belief of this sort, it being always sure to put their opponents apparently in the wrong. But, tricks of this sort, though very good, in some cases, for the first time, will not bear a repetition. We are told, that the Cockneys went once to see a man six feet high, ~~drinking~~ *blowing* a hornpipe in a quart bottle;

but, when, in order to compensate for their disappointment, they were assured, that, if they would but come the next night, they should see him dance in a pint bottle, it is said, that even the half-idiot Cockneys perceived, either that they were "nature's fools," or the fools of the operator.

CONTINENTAL ALLIANCES.—That an alliance and hearty co-operation between this kingdom and the great powers of the continent are the only means of checking the encroachments of France, and of preserving our own independence, every man, of any political information, now, notwithstanding the efforts of Mr. Wilberforce, seems to be convinced. The Speech affords reason to believe, that an alliance of this sort, to some extent at least, has been, or will be, accomplished. That we have formed treaties with Russia and Sweden is certain; and, if the ministerial writers are to be believed, there is a prospect of inducing Austria to join the coalition. Of Prussia, no hope, at present, appears to be entertained. With respect to the *principle* of this great measure, there will be no difference of opinion except what may arise from the maxim laid down by Mr. Wilberforce, who insisted, that "the ministers and people of this country were too honest to have any connexion with the powers of the Continent." But, though there can be hardly any difference of opinion as to the general principle of continental connexions, or as to the principle, perhaps, of the particular coalition now projected, and, though it is possible, that the ministers may so conduct themselves in this respect, as to afford little or no ground of difference of opinion as to the detail of its formation, or the means and mode of carrying into effect; yet, it must be allowed to be very probable, that, as to these, there may be very good ground for opposition. Let us hope, that this will not be the case; but, it is necessary to guard against the fallacious conclusion, that, because you approve of the principle of a measure, you are to approve of the measure in all its parts, and also of the manner of its execution. And, this caution is, it will be granted, peculiarly necessary, when we consider, who are the persons, by whom the present proposed measure is to be executed; when we recollect their conduct in the former war against France, and especially when we recollect their language and conduct at the last peace, when all our allies were abandoned for the sake of sugar and spice islands, when we heard Mr. Addington, who is now again at the head of affairs, make the declaration

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contained in the motto to this sheet, and when we heard his coadjutor, Mr. Pitt, utter, or give his unqualified approbation to, similar sentiments. This consideration is, indeed, of vast importance, whether as affecting the forming of a continental coalition, or the attainment of its professed object. For, besides the want of confidence which, in the continental powers, must arise from the present unstable appearance of the English cabinet, on whatever side that cabinet is viewed, it is quite impossible not to foresee, that, upon the urgency of circumstances at home, or upon the first reverse of fortune abroad, there will arise, even in the very bosom of the government, a rivalry for popular favour through the means of peace; and, foreseeing this, the continental powers will, it is to be feared, never enter heartily into the contest, and constantly be too much disposed, each to make the best bargain she can for herself. Will any man, who takes an impartial view of all the circumstances of the case, deny that such a result is to be apprehended? and, if such should be the result, who will deny that we shall then be in a much worse situation than we now are? Considered in themselves, there is no objection to subsidies, though subsidies without an English army will avail little; but, if by subsidies we obtain no real, and no degree of permanent, security, it will not be denied, that to raise twenty or thirty, or even ten, millions of money in taxes, for the purpose of sending the said money abroad, must prove a very serious injury. This, therefore, is all that can, at present, be said of the proposed measure: a coalition against France, in which we are a party, is, in itself considered, greatly to be desired; but, that, if there be a want of energy, of confidence, of fortitude, of real patriotism, in the persons conducting it, it may hasten, and may add to the horrors of, the evil that it is, on our part, intended to prevent. That, according to the way in which it is used, it may prove a blessing, or a curse; it may tend to give us permanent peace and security, or, after a long and ineffectual struggle, it may plunge us, first in ruin and finally in slavery.

**ADDITIONAL BURDENS.**—To those who believed the former statements and promises of either of the present premiers, the passage of his Majesty's speech that alludes to intended *additional* burdens may appear somewhat surprising. To the readers of the Register, however, it scarcely can so appear, seeing that, as often as the occasion has offered, an endeavour has always been made to guard them against this sort of disap-

pointment. When Mr. Addington brought forward his war system of finance, in June, 1803, he made use of these words: "The committee will perceive, that the great object I have in view is to raise a large part of the supplies within the year. The extent to which I wish to carry this principle is this, *that there shall be no increase whatever of the public debt during the war.*"\* He afterwards qualifies this statement by saying, that the provisions he has made for carrying on a vigorous, and even a protracted contest, will prevent the necessity of making any greater addition to the public debt "than what will be annually *liquidated by the sinking fund.*" The fallacy of such statements as this latter was shown at the time, and, I was sorry to hear, very much to the mortification of Mr. Pitt † To *liquidate* means, to "*clear away*;" but, how is any part of the national debt "*cleared away*," unless we *cease to pay the interest on it*? When my neighbour tells me, that he has liquidated one half of a bond that he had entered into, I understand him, and who would not understand him, as having cleared away one half of the principal of the bond, and, of course, that he *no longer has to pay interest on it*? Is not this the sense in which all mankind understand the word *liquidate*? How, then, can that word be applied to the operation of the sinking fund, which operation consists of a mere transfer of a portion of the evidences of the national debt, and which never does, or can, lessen, in the smallest degree, the *amount of the interest annually to be paid*? The way to view the national debt is, to confine your eye to the *interest only*. If you find that grow *less*, then you may truly say that some of the debt has been *liquidated, cleared away, paid off*; but, while you are called upon to pay interest to the *same annual* amount as if there were no sinking fund, to believe that that fund is producing an annual *decrease* in the debt, argues a degree of stupidity almost beneath the human species. To say the truth, however, the people are not thus stupid; they do not thus give up their faculties of calculating and reasoning, and yield to a credulity so blind as that to which their hopes in the effect of the sinking fund are attributed: they are deceived as to a point of fact. They think that part of the debt is *really* liquidated every year; *really* cleared away; *really* paid off; and, of course, that,

\* See this memorable speech: Register, Vol. III. p. 906, et seq. The part he quoted is in p. 911.

† Register, Vol. III. p. 920.



upon that part of the debt, they have *no longer to pay interest*. From very extensive and careful observation, I am convinced, that, out of every ten thousand persons in the kingdom, nine thousand, nine hundred and ninety-nine, who view the matter in this light. If they knew that they had interest to pay upon the "liquidated" part of the debt, as well as upon the part not "liquidated," is there a man amongst them, who would not scout the whole project?—To remove this deep-rooted and widely-spread deception must, however, be left to the hand of time; we will, therefore, return to the subject more immediately before us, taking up the premier where we left him, promising the parliament, that, though the war should be vigorous and protracted, he had, in his budget of June, 1803, provided the pecuniary means for supporting it without any addition to the national debt, beyond the sum of six millions a year, which sum, he said, would, of course, be raised by loan. He was speaking of Great Britain only, but we must not quite forget Ireland, when we are talking upon these matters. For *that* year, indeed (1803), his war taxes not being likely to come into full operation very soon, he took a loan of ten millions for Great Britain and of two millions for Ireland; but, he assured the Parliament, that this would not be the case in future. Notwithstanding these assurances, however, he came last year, to the same unobjecting body of men, demanded, and instantly obtained, authority to make a loan of 10 millions for England and of 5½ millions for Ireland!—And here it is proper to stop a moment, and to say a word or two with a view of shewing, that these loans for Ireland are not altogether unworthy of the notice of us English people. Five millions and three quarters was the sum borrowed on account of Ireland last year. The whole annual revenue of Ireland amounts to only about two million eight hundred thousand pounds! The annual permanent revenue of England (using that word to avoid repetition of the clumsy phrase Great Britain) amounts to about 26 millions; and what would be said, were she to borrow 72 millions in one year? But, this, we shall be told, is only for one year and away. So very great a loan will not be made for Ireland every year, perhaps, but a loan, very nearly equal in amount to the whole of her annual revenue, has been made *every year*, for many years past. Let us hear Mr. Foster, the Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer upon this subject; for it is one of very great importance, and closely connected with the question of

our ability to continue the war. "It fell," says he, "to my lot, in the late parliament of Ireland, to represent to the House, that the revenues of that country were in a rapidly decaying and decreasing state; and, upon the same occasion, I prognosticated, that they would not become better. Experience has verified the prediction; for, so far from being better, they are actually in a worse state, as will appear from a statement of the Irish debt at different periods." He then took several periods, beginning with 1793; but, it will be better to take them further back.

In 1783, Ireland had *no debt*.  
In 1784, her debt began with £1,527,600  
In 1788, it amounted to..... 1,718,240  
In 1794, ..... 2,134,140  
In 1798, ..... 10,128,906  
In 1800, (year before the union) 24,207,290  
In 1803, ..... 39,541,258  
In 1804, (month of July) ..... 53,296,356

After drawing a comparison, as to the relative amount of the loans made by England and Ireland, he proceeds thus. "The worst circumstance of all that belongs to this ruinous system, is, that the Government of Ireland is borrowing money *out of* Ireland; and, by that means, are not only creating absentee debts and absentee taxes, but are contracting all the means which the country possesses of increasing her exports and diminishing her imports. But, the debt to be raised has a still worse tendency: it has the effect of diminishing that revenue which should pay the interest of it. Ireland is in as bad a state with regard to her revenues as her debt. In the year 1800, the amount of the ordinary revenue was 2,800,000l. when the debt was but 25 millions; last year, the revenue was 2,789,000l. that is 16,000l. less than it was the year before the union, and the debt of Ireland now being 53 millions. But, assuming the net produce of the ordinary revenue at 2,800,000l. the amount of interest and charges to be defrayed thereout, on the sole account of the national debt, is 2,500,000l.; so that, scarcely 300,000l. will remain to be applied to the joint charge of the empire, Ireland's proportion of that joint charge being, for this year, 4 millions! But the *prospect* is still worse, for it appears, that the revenue has decreased since January last, in the proportion of from 2 to 3 hundred thousand pounds in the year, and if it continue to diminish in the same ratio to the end of the year, there will remain *nothing*



"for the joint charge, and Ireland will, in that respect, be a sheet of blank paper." Then he proceeds with his plans for arresting the progress of the evil. To what extent these plans will succeed, cannot, as yet, be fully ascertained; but, if we are to judge from present appearances, the success will fall very far short of the object. The conclusion is, that, though the *name* of Ireland may continue to be made use of in the making of loans, the interest of those loans, or, which is the same in effect, Ireland's share of the joint charge, must fall upon England; and, indeed, it is said (for I have not yet seen the pamphlet) that "an Irish member" recommends, as the wisest course, *for England at once to take upon herself the whole of the Irish national debt.* In speaking, therefore, of the loans of the year we must never forget to include those which are made for Ireland.—The whole borrowed last year was, then, 15½ millions; and, this year, the loans will scarcely amount to less than 20, or, probably, 25 millions, instead of 6 millions, or 8 millions including Ireland, the sum to which Mr. Addington said the wants of the nation would be restricted; for, it is by no means fair to allow him to have had in view to borrow for Ireland a sum every year more than equal to her whole revenue.—We must now hear the declarations of the same minister, at the time of opening his budget in April last. "The committee" said he, "will observe, that, though, in the present instance, the ways and means do not accomplish the object of preventing all accumulation of debt, the addition this year will be under 4 millions. But the committee will understand, that if they should adopt the provisions, which I have placed under their consideration, there will be ways and means sufficient to meet what I consider the average amount of the war-expenses. If the system which I recommend be adopted, and the war should continue for three years, we shall have arrived, at the end of those three years, at a point when all addition to the public debt will cease, and the debt will be *diminishing*, even under our present expenses. Thus, we shall have to carry on the contest, if it should continue beyond that period, under the circumstance of a diminution rather than an increase of debt."† Ireland is carefully kept out of sight, observe. All his propositions were adopted; and, we have

a right to demand, from him, the promised consequences, but, while some persons were really weak enough to be in expectation of those consequences, forth comes the Speech, regretting the necessity of "*additional burdens and sacrifices!*" But, these additions may, possibly, arise from the *subsidies* expected to be called for by the powers of the Continent; and, it is right to state, that the minister, in both the budget-speeches, above referred to, expressly excepted the sums that might be called for by such a contingency. Whatever, therefore, may be the amount of those subsidies, it must be added to the 6 millions a year, which he always regarded it as necessary to continue to borrow during the war. Suppose, then, the subsidies for the present year should amount to 5 millions, as it is said they will, the loan for England should not exceed 11 millions, and, for Ireland (certainly within the amount of her whole annual revenue), it ought not to exceed 1½ millions, or, at most 2 millions; yet, as was above-stated, the probability is, that it must exceed 20 millions for England alone, or, that new taxes to the amount of the deficit must be imposed. The truth is, I believe, that we shall have a very considerable loan and new taxes to a great amount besides; and, the reason for making these remarks, is, that people may be prepared for the exertions they will be called on to make. The doubling of the Income-Tax has been spoken of as a probable measure. The tax is objectionable only because it sets the neighbours of a man to pry into his secrets; to fathom the length of his purse; to wound and finally destroy his landable pride; in many cases to mar his fortune; to prevent his recovering from a state of depression; to break down his independence of spirit, and to efface from his mind those notions of liberty and security, without which (whatever other nations may be) Englishmen are worth nothing. But, in that quarter, (I mean the funds) where the loudest cry has been set up against the Income-tax, none of these objections are of any weight. There the property is *visible*. The owner has, of himself, exposed the evidences of it to the world. There the assessor sees only what a man *has*, and does not discover what he *has not*, but what, in many instances much to his advantage, he is thought to have, even by the hawk-eyed assessor himself. To a tax upon the funds, therefore, there can be no objection that will not equally well apply to a tax upon houses or land; and, the

\* Parliamentary Debates, vol. II, p. 773.

† Ibid. vol. II. p. 356.



most unwise and inconsistent part of Mr. Addington's finance administration certainly was his yielding to Mr. Pitt in making exceptions with regard to that tax; exceptions which appear to have had no other rational object in view than that of obtaining popularity amongst the holders in the funds.—The whole annual amount of all the new taxes will, probably, not fall far short of 5 millions. This addition must greatly add to the quantity of paper-money; which will, in its turn, produce a fresh depreciation of the currency, and, of course, a nominal rise in prices, which will, for a time at least, operate to the disadvantage of the labouring poor, and will increase the poor rates. But, as long as the paper-money system lasts this must be borne. At those partisans of this system, who cry when the tax-gatherer comes, men of sense laugh. If you say, "down with the funds," a thousand tongues, in all manner of dialects, are instantly let loose against you, till you are happy to be relieved by the howl set up at the approach of one of the hundred thousand able-bodied tax-gatherers, whom this nation has the happiness to possess, and who, if they could operate upon the enemy, would soon make them repent setting their foot upon English ground.

INTERNAL STATE OF THE COUNTRY.—This the speech describes as being very "prosperous." It seemed unnecessary to say so, at a moment when provisions were uncommonly scarce; when the currency of Ireland, at least, was in a state of notorious degradation; and, when, from a report lying before the parliament itself, it was known, that since the year 1785, the poor rates of England had risen from 2 millions to 5 millions, and that the present number of parish poor in England, amounted to *more than one eighth part of the whole population*. Such did not appear to be the fit moment for making the internal prosperity of the country a prominent feature in his Majesty's speech. It could do no good. It was to awaken reflections which might as well have lain dormant; to challenge discussions, in which you were sure to lose; and, as to any advantage thus to be gained by deceiving foreign nations, the idea is, one would think, too childish to be for one moment entertained by any man of common understanding.—In the description of our internal state, Ireland is, doubtless, "included; and is Ireland really in a prosperous state?"

SPANISH WAR.—The Declaration on the part of his Majesty will be found in a subsequent page; but, the correspondence

during the negotiation, as having been laid before Parliament, and as belonging to *parliamentary* rather than *state* papers, will be preserved in the Parliamentary Debates, and will therein be published next week.—These papers having but just made their appearance, there is no room here for any investigation of them; but, I cannot refrain from observing, that, if the conduct of Mr. Pitt's cabinet be *justifiable*, even as to the question of policy, that of the former cabinet must be *condemned*. Of this both parts of the *present* cabinet seem to be convinced; and, accordingly, in the *Sun*, that is, the Pitt's leading print, an unqualified attack on the conduct of the Sidmouths has been begun. Having traced the dispute with Spain down to the month of January last, the writer proceeds thus: "After months had elapsed since it was known that a treaty had been concluded with France, of which Spain refused to communicate the stipulations to England; the late cabinet, *with these facts before its eyes*, instructs Mr. Frere to demand, it is true, satisfaction as to the points in dispute, and to ask for explanation as to the secret treaty, but *cautiously to avoid bringing the discussion to an unfavourable issue*, except in the two cases of the actual entrance of French troops into Spain, or of naval armaments being in such forward preparation," for hostile purposes, "as may speedily require the exertions of his Majesty's forces." In other words, the Secretary of State directs his Majesty's minister to *solicit* for explanation and redress, and to obtain it, *if he can*; if not, he is to *sit down contented until the injury be completed, and our enemy be in perfect readiness to strike the first blow!* Mr. Frere observed these instructions *unwillingly it is to be hoped*, for if on the 27th of December he had considered the commencement of hostilities as probable, and had thought it his duty to advise our Commanders of the circumstance, how difficult must he have thought it to abstain from an open rupture, when in answer to his repeated remonstrances as to the naval armaments, and the open sale of prizes in Spanish ports, he was told that Spain must employ precautions, and that the sale of British ships was "a lawful speculation!" It could not be quite *congenial to the feelings of a man who received his diplomatic education under Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville*, to remain quietly at Madrid under circumstances like these; indeed it may, perhaps, be thought, that in his note to Don Cevallos, of the eighteenth of February, he rather exceeded



“ his orders, and gave to the representations of his court *an appearance of vigour* inconsistent with the cautious instructions which he had received from the Secretary of State.” — He then describes the further aggressive operations of Spain, and concludes in the following words: “ England knew all this—but *Mr. Aldington and Lord Hawkesbury* determined to wink at it all, until the measure of iniquity should be full. This was the history of the conduct which his Majesty had been advised to hold towards Spain, when he called to his councils *Mr. Pitt and Lord Hawkesbury*. Difficult was their task, to rescue their Sovereign and their country from the fatal consequences of indecision, to counteract the effect of hostile measures of a year's unmolested growth, and to assert once more the dignity of the British name!” — Well said! out with it; *laugour, incongruity, incapacity, imbecility,* and all! What! and is this the reconciliation, of which we have heard so much! Is this the “renewal of love;” or is it, “three weeks after marriage?”—[I am compelled to break off here.]

☞ Since the foregoing part of this Summary was written, it has been reported, that Dr. Prettyman is *not* to be Archbishop of Canterbury!!!

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### COBBETT'S

#### SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS,

FOR THE YEAR 1804.

This is a Volume of the same form, and printed in the same character, with the Political Register, being, however, considerably larger in bulk than either of the two last volumes of that work. It consists of Letters, Essays, &c. &c. taken from the English, American, and French Journals, for the year 1804, the subjects being all of that nature which renders them interesting to the politician.—The title is not new. “The Spirit of the Public Journals,” a work amounting, in the whole, to some hundreds of small volumes, was, some years ago, published in France. In England, a very small volume has, for several years past, annually appeared under the same title. But, the few and scanty pages of this last-mentioned work are devoted almost exclusively to the fugitive efforts of the imagination; a collection very entertaining, and, in some respects useful, but quite inadequate to the purposes of the present undertaking, which undertaking has arisen out of the inconvenience experienced

by myself from the want of such a collection as that which I now present to the public.—The *Political Register* contained all the promulgated authentic documents of the times, whether of a Public nature, as relating to more than one nation, such as treaties, conventions, manifestoes, &c. &c.; or, Foreign Official, as relating to the internal affairs of foreign nations respectively; or, Domestic Official, as relating solely to the internal affairs of this kingdom. The *Parliamentary Debates*, given with so much correctness and such perfect impartiality, including the minutes of each day's business, together with a complete collection of all the material accounts and other documents submitted to the two Houses, left nothing to desire as a record of the proceedings of the Legislature. But, there was yet one source of political information left to waste itself in the stream of time; that source which I am now making an attempt to preserve. Mr. Adam, in his letter to the Abbé de Mably, upon the subject of an intention on the part of the latter, to write a history of the American Revolution, reminds that celebrated person, that, amongst the most important of his materials, he must consider, the English and the American *Public Journals* of the time, for, that though he will not find there a true account of the motives by which many of the leading men in each country were secretly actuated, he will find there, and there only, a perfectly true account of the opinions and feelings of the people upon every topic and event, and will also perceive the means that were made use of, sometimes for good and sometimes for evil, to check or to encourage, to produce or to destroy, those opinions and those feelings; and that, thus, he will frequently clearly discover the origin of measures, which, without attending to this the only record of public opinion, he would never be able to trace to their true source. And, where is the political observer, who does not perceive the justice, and the application to the present times, of these remarks of the American President? We hear what is advanced in State Papers and other documents strictly official; but, we well know, that the real motive is there frequently disguised; and we also know, that the language in parliament is seldom without some degree of reserve. To come at a full view, or, at least, the fullest that is to be obtained, of the motives of public men, we must have recourse to the public journals, where the partisans, and where sometimes the ministers themselves under the cover of partisans, feel the public pulse, always endeavour to direct the public opinion, and, where we, in many



cases, perceive them yielding to that opinion. Here, too, we must look for the statements and the reasoning, made use of at the time, in justification or in condemnation, of every public measure, especially during the prorogation of parliament; and, at subsequent epochs, these are extremely useful to refer to, because, being the effect of first impressions, they generally present, the most natural and most forcible view of the best and the worst side of every subject they treat of, and because, from them, as from radical positions, we are almost always enabled to trace the adverse disputants through all the ramifications of the dispute, and thereby to arrive at the means of forming a correct and settled opinion for ourselves. Upon the subjects, for instance, of the turning out of Mr. Addington, that of the formation of the new ministry, and of the Additional Force Bill of Mr. Pitt, subjects which circumstances have now revived, we are, by this work, enabled to recur to the public language and sentiments of the months of April, May, and June last; to refresh our memories as to the first professions of the political parties, as well as to the feelings, and expectations of the public; a recurrence obviously of great advantage to every politician and to every reader upon political subjects.—Mr. Adams, in the letter before referred to, after so earnestly recommending a careful reference to the public journals of England and America, acknowledges the great difficulty of obtaining the means of so doing, owing to the bulky and perishable nature of all such publications; and, indeed, out of, perhaps, a hundred thousand sets of London public journals for the year that has just expired, there are not, probably, with the exception of those which are preserved in a few of the coffee-houses and reading-rooms, twenty unbroken sets now in existence. The author of the *PLAIN REPLY*, a pamphlet very often quoted in the *Political Register*, observes, when speaking of Mr. Addington's acceptance of office in 1801, that "those who really wish to form a fair judgment upon the subject, should turn back to the newspapers of the day." This is very true; but, how were those persons to profit from this observation, when, probably, out of the thousand or two thousand, who read the pamphlet, not more than one or two had it in their power to turn back to the newspapers of the day? All the principal London papers must be referred to; and where is the person, who purchases those papers, at the expense of, at least, a hundred pounds a year? If any one takes them all, who is there that preserves them? And, if we could

find an instance of both, how laborious must be the task of hunting out the "two grains of wheat in a bushel of chaff," without the aid of table of contents, index, or any other of the facilities presented in a volume like the present?—Besides the articles relating to what has become, or is likely at any time to become, matter of party controversy, those of a more speculative turn, relating to whatever is connected with the science of politics, have been carefully collected; and, it is presumed, that the extending of the compass of the work, so as to embrace, as far as has been found practicable, the public journals of America and France, will be productive of great utility.—The work has, as I before stated, arisen out of the inconvenience which I myself experienced for the want of such a collection; and, it appears to me, that in possession of the three works, the *Political Register*, the *Parliamentary Debates*, and the *Spirit of the Public Journals*, the politician and the historian will possess every help afforded them by the press, relative to the feelings, opinions, and facts of the times.—With regard to the manner in which the compilation has been made, while I have thought it necessary, in order to show the spirit of the times and of the different parties, to preserve the light as well as the serious matter, whether in verse or prose, and whether in praise or censure of public men, little as well as great, I have observed, in every instance, the most scrupulous impartiality, without, on any occasion, availing myself of the opportunity of blunting a shaft when aimed at the party to which I may be supposed to be attached, or even when aimed at myself; perfectly ready to be included in the avowal, that every one ought to sink, when not supported by reason and truth.—The order is, of course, Chronological. Each article has a head descriptive of its subject, and noticing the particular publication from which it is taken. The subjects together with the dates are again noticed in the running title at the top of the respective pages. The whole is preceded by a Table of Contents, and followed by a copious Index. The volume, which includes about five hundred different articles, extends to above thirteen hundred pages, and contains, upon fine paper and in a character of the same size as that of the *Political Register*, as much matter as is usually contained in seven of those octavo volumes which are generally sold at eight shillings each in boards. The price, elegantly half-bound in Russia leather, is £1. 7s. The publishers are Mr. BOND, Pall Mall, and Mr. BAGSHAW, Bow-street, Covent

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Garden; and the work may be had by application to any of the Booksellers or News-men of London or Westminster.—The day of publication will be Friday next, the first of February. W.M. COBBETT.

January 25, 1805.

\* \* Number 53 of THE PARLIAMEN-TARY DEBATES, being the first Number for the present Session, is *now ready for delivery*; and the public may be assured, that the Numbers will succeed each other without the least delay.

MR. PITT'S PARISH ARMY.

SIR,—The attention of military men being much occupied, at this crisis, by the impending discussion of the state of the army, more particularly of the famous Project Bill; and Mr. Pitt having already hinted his intention of defending this measure; though very unequal to such a task, I cannot resist attempting a few observations on the subject. From what I am able to collect from newspaper reports, the hon. gent. asserts, "that every advantage that could have been expected, has accrued from the measure." This is no doubt a negative sort of commendation. Most men of sound and unbiassed judgment, predicted that no good could or would ensue from it. But, as every bad measure may be rendered more or less mischievous according to its mode of execution, I affirm, that less evil might have ensued in this instance; and, therefore, more good. Indeed, Sir, it is very evident, that the projector has been completely deceived and disappointed, but, rather than confess himself in the wrong, he will have recourse to sophistry. I would recommend to the hon. gent. the following passage from the Rambler: "As all error is meanness, it becomes every man who consults his own dignity, to retract it as soon as he discovers it, without fearing any censure so much as that of his own mind." If he really expected to raise no more than three or four thousand men, what possible excuse can be made for the addition to our expense *in the officers of fifty or sixty battalions*? Battalions formed for the express purpose of receiving, and pursuing the hon. gent.'s parish bantlings. And, so much was he alarmed, lest the dear creatures might be neglected, that, ere the bill had well passed the House of Lords, the gazettes were oversworn with the commissions of officers for the *sister* battalions, in a manner quite unparalleled since the heyday of the Volunteer Mania. If such addition was necessary, there would have been some ap-

pearance of economy to have officered these battalions from the half-pay list; instead of which, that list will eventually be more than doubled by this very measure. It is here worthy of remark, that, although, in all the plans and projects of the late and present ministers, the constant song was the source of the half-pay list, as providing officers; although we have largely increased our regular army, and we have raised an army of reserve, an army of volunteers, and an army of parish men, with light battalions, colonial battalions, and a long list of *et cetera's*, two-thirds of the superior officers reduced at the peace of Amiens cannot get employment, and remain on the half-pay list, on an allowance insufficient to procure them bread! Amongst the many wonderful merits of this bill, we are seriously told, that it has had the effect of improving the recruiting for the regular army. Now, Sir, I confess, I do not credit the assertion that the service has had any additional success; but, if it has, I think it might be accounted for, by the abolition of balloting, the want of work at this season; and the high price of bread; and, if there has occurred such a change, how will ministers account for their inconsistency, in resorting no later than last month to the measure of recruiting for rank? Which is at this moment going on in the cavalry. It is rather singular, too, that ministers have been constantly assuring us, that we had a sufficiency of this force; yet, three times has this mode of *forcing* men for this service been resorted to. But, Sir, although there are many reasons totally unconnected with Mr. Pitt's project, by which any increase of recruits might be accounted for, it is not the case. From the incapacity of Mr. Pitt as a war minister; by the treatment of the army at the peace; by the vote of thanks, &c. &c. &c. to those citizens, in scarlet, who *full of resolution, and rich in loyalty*, with their *splendid colours* and *exemplary bounds*, to borrow military phrases, from one of the worthies delegated by Mr. Addington to command one of those corps, who were "to hurl back the thunder on the heads of our enemies;" the military character has been so much degraded that no temporizing scheme will ever restore to it its lustre. We must get rid of the projector and his projects; we must try to forget that military honours have ever been trampled upon by shop-keepers; and, by placing the fame and honour of the army in the hands of men of real virtue and merit. Each of us may with pride exult in the name of Soldier.—I am, Sir, yours, &c. &c. MILES.

January, 23, 1805.



LETTER OF MR. BURKE,

RELATIVE TO IRISH CATHOLICS.

[This letter, or rather extract of a letter (for the authenticity of which I pledge myself) was published, on a printed half-sheet, in Ireland, in 1792; a time, when ministers were endeavouring to put a stop to an intended petition of the Catholics to the Irish parliament for relief. Its application to the present times, an application which every one must perceive, is the circumstance which induces me to publish it here.—  
WM. C.]

I find what pains the Irish government has taken to perplex itself. As to some gentlemen amongst the Catholics, I should be rather surprised if they did not act just as they have done, upon any signification from power. Those of any fortune are persons of ancient and respectable families, though none of them have, of late, and many of them never, illustrated their names. Their education, connexions, habits, and sole views of preferment have been in France and Germany, where their pedigrees alone afforded them any hope of distinction. They were, therefore more proud of their quality of gentlemen, than many of those could be who had hopes from any thing else. On the other hand, the majority of their own communion who remained in the kingdom, being doomed to an abject servitude, and by the laws, (so far as laws could operate in that case) sentenced to beggary, the distinction between the old gentlemen who still retained their religion and estates, and the commonality of that religion, and middle sort, was, without all comparison, greater than between people of the same ranks among Protestants. To my knowledge (at least in my time) they perfectly despised their brethren, and would have been glad at any time, if any thing, without extremely wounding their conscience, or perhaps rebounding on themselves, could have been contrived to discriminate them from the rest of the description, even at the expense of those from whom they were so separated—they would have desired nothing better. As a new race of Roman Catholics have risen by their industry, their abilities, and their good fortune, to considerable opulence, and of course to an independent spirit; I observed that the old standard gentlemen were still less disposed to them (as rivals in consideration and importance) than to the old Catholics, who were only poor straggling cottagers, farmers, or tradesmen; they despised them less, but they hate

them more. If this spirit should continue, (I should not at all be amazed, though extremely concerned to find it so), if they should chuse of the two, rather to remain under their present disqualifications, than partake in the advantages of freemen, with those they ought to cherish, love, protect, and co-operate with in every thing rationally proposed for their common benefit. If you happen to fall in with any gentleman who is in the situation, without having acquired the character I have described, try to get him to make the rest sensible of the mischief which must arise to himself and others of the same description, from cherishing any longer this mistaken spirit, so perfectly contrary to their dignity and their interest. By comparing themselves with the individuals of their brethren, they may indulge some sort of pride; but if they compare themselves with the Protestants, either in landed property, in titles, in rank, in gentility, illustrated by great offices and high commands, they are as nothing; and even by many Protestants they are equalled, and indeed much exceeded in the vain matter upon which they despise their brethren. But by indentifying themselves to the corps to which they naturally belong, their properties will tell ten-fold in consideration; then, and then only, they become of real importance; and, if they know how to use their situation, may rank, as I wish them to do, with any men in the kingdom.—As to the Catholic clergy, I am not at all surprised at their servility. The name of a popish priest has so long been a matter of reproach, and of a mixed, heterogeneous sensation of fear, abhorrence, and contempt, that there was no charge, however absurd and ridiculous, which would not readily be credited against them; they were supposed to be possessed of an influence hardly possible to be obtained by any set of men, but which, in them, had no existence in that degree, or (to my certain knowledge) almost in any degree at all; so that every disorder amongst the common people was attributed either to their direction or connivance. As Catholic secular clergy without any support from the state, it was impossible that their power should be considerable. Every part of the dogmas of that religion is so known, so fixed, so much in rule, and so unalterable that the clergy had no scope in the wide field of metaphysical, theological, or critical matters, (which form means of obtaining friends and partisans, and producing pleasing novelties to the audience), to exercise these modes of influence which are known to be so very powerful.—The sacra-

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ments are in the same frame; the confession which is thought so much of, is but a routine, and may be made to any; and the absolutions, on the conditions of which the penitent himself must judge, is a thing of course. The masses are at a fixed rate, and never are, or can be refused, or delayed. Preaching, the most powerful arm of popular priesthood, is sparingly used by them—and what there is of it, is mostly in the hands of friars, who have something more of influence than the parish clergy, but not much.—If the Catholic clergy should be so unwise as to meddle in political matters, and disgust their people, they may lose the little consideration they possess; they may lose their flocks, and they will have neither profit nor credit in return. But, if they either wholly lie by, or fall in with their people in their civil pursuits, which the others understand better than the clergy do, and which they will pursue, whether the clergy like it or not, they will rise every day in the respect and influence which belongs to their office. Let them not deceive themselves; they cannot possess the sources of influence and lead, that are in the hands of dissenters of other descriptions; but, if they do not counteract their own interests, there is a decent field yet open to them.—As to government, I see their scheme has been to divide the Catholics; a measure which, whether they mean to use them to counteract other more dangerous factions, or merely to keep them aloof from those factions, is equally ill-judged and mischievous. They may divide them indeed, but in the partition, the weakest part will fall to their share. The strength of the Catholics is not in their dozen or score of old gentlemen; weak indeed they would be, if this were the case. Their force consists in two things; their numbers, and their growing property, which grows with the growth of the country itself, and contributes to its increase.—If government abstracts the old gentlemen from that which is the natural strength of the body, they will leave the gentlemen without credit, and themselves without the service they might derive from their influence with the rest; they will lose the substance and catch a shadow indeed.

#### DEFENCE

##### OF THE FUNDING SYSTEM.

SIR,—Your Political Register finds its way to this remote corner of the British Isles. Presuming on your indulgence, I request permission to state, that there are two im-

portant subjects occasionally discussed in your work, of which, my view is essentially at variance with yours. They are those of the paper currency, and the national debt of our country.—On the first of these, to which I now confine myself, there appears to me to be much and general misapprehension.—When you hear the mass of paper in circulation throughout this country spoken of, you frequently find that it is confounded with the currency of America, An. 1776-83, and with the assignats of France, of a more modern date; and thus it is attempted to assimilate what is *toto cælo* distinct.—There are, Sir, two different descriptions of paper currency; the one spurious, and the other legitimate, the former has its origin in poverty, and has no solid basis whereon to stand; it is the herald of the wants of its authors, and often the harbinger of their ruin; suspicion, and despondency march in its train; its increase superinduces its depreciation, and its depreciation produces a compulsory increase, until at length resembling the lean and shrivelled kine of the Egyptian Monarch of old, it swallows up and devours all the comforts of the land. But the latter is the genuine offspring of the commercial prosperity of a country, and the representative of its riches, it rests upon the basis of immense national and individual opulence; it invigorates its parent, facilitates and forwards her operations, and furnishes the means of wafting her to the distant corners of the world.—There is betwixt the two this farther remarkable distinction; the spurious currency comes forward amidst national distress or national degradation; the other retires at the approach of either. National prosperity makes the last to expand as the flowers of the sun; national adversity as a chilling frost shrivels up its sinews, and soon causes its annihilation.—Here, Mr. Cobbett, I think you exclaim. What! do you indeed mean to affirm that the paper currency of our country indicates our prosperity? What! when 18 millions are circulated by the Bank of England alone, and when the gold of this last lies under parliamentary interdict? Why! if these are indications of our prosperity, we are prosperous indeed! But, I cry mercy, Sir. Permit me to say, that you take too limited a view of the paper currency of the kingdom. You appear to me to consider only one side of this important national question. You take a station near the Bank of England; from that station you survey the horizon of commerce; and, because your friends and you cannot at once convert the notes of that Bank into gold, you augur the decline and



fall of the country. Thus the seaman, as yet inexperienced on the deep, when the gale increases, and the billows roar, figures to himself "the wreck of nature, and the "crush of worlds." He is at the moment unable to reflect that the elementary warfare is, perhaps, confined to the latitude in which he toils, that its effects are beneficial to millions of his fellow creatures; that by purifying the atmosphere it expels pestilence and plague, and conveys a salubrious influence through regions which should otherwise be scenes of desolation.—It is, I presume, generally admitted, that the greater part of the years 1802-3, were uncommonly unfavourable to commercial men; the dread of invasion, the new channels through which commerce had to force its way, and a multitude of other causes combined in damping commercial enterprise. A general want of confidence was the result; and the consequences were contemplated by many with serious apprehension. During this period, I admit, that the issue of paper by the Bank of England increased; but, I affirm, that the issue of paper, whether in the shape of bills or notes, decreased throughout the kingdom at large in a tenfold ratio; and, farther, that this decrease of the latter, naturally and necessarily (as shall be by and by explained) occasioned the increase of the former. For example, Sir; had you had access to the books of any or all of the Scotch Banks, you would have found that they had less paper (perhaps by one half) in circulation last year, than they have had for many years past; and, I dare contend, that with the single exception of the Bank of England, the same fact would be found true in every Bank where paper is circulated throughout the British Empire.—In one borough, Sir, in this northern district there are two agents for two of the Edinburgh Banks. They have frequently discounted bills to the extent of £10,000 per week; but for the greater part of last year, their discounts were limited by the express commands of their constituents to £500 per week. The consequence was an almost total stagnation of our little trade. A bank note had become a *rara avis in terris*; and we were literally in numerous instances driven to the necessity of bartering our commodities, because of the want of a circulating medium. Some of our half-thinkers on these subjects, might naturally exclaim? What! Not have notes enough. Is it not the interest of a banker to circulate his paper? And when multitudes call upon him to do so, are not his profits increased in that ratio? But, Sir, these wise men should do the bankers the

justice to allow that they are the best judges of their own interest. Circulating their paper when that circulation is *steady*, is no doubt, their profit; but when a general want of confidence renders the circulation otherwise, it becomes necessary for them to restrict it; nay, it becomes impracticable for them to do the contrary; and this for various reasons.—1st. Common sense will dictate the propriety of restricting discounts, when the stagnation of commerce destroys the basis on which credit rests; or, in other words, destroys property. I do not know, Sir, how Mr. Abraham Newland, and your London bankers do business, but I have never yet known a banker to be one of those polite accommodating gentlemen who would at once give their notes to men, of whose pecuniary abilities they were doubtful; for what is the nature of the transaction into which a banker enters, when he discounts a merchants bill for three months? He, in fact, becomes guarantee to the public for that merchant during that period, and to the extent of the sum discounted; or, in other words, his fortune must to this extent be at the mercy of the holder of his notes, until the merchant whom he has accommodated returns the value.—2dly, Bankers are of all others the most severe checks upon each others operations. A bank agent who is employed in circulating the notes of any banking company, is *ex officio*, an agent of hostility to every other Bank. If he *does not* accept of the notes of other bankers in part of the payment which he receives, he injures their credit with the public; and this immediately compresses or destroys the circulation of their paper. If he *does* accept of their notes, it is his business, his direct trade, to pick up as many of them as he possibly can; he consequently, asks his friends to assist him in doing so, so as to circulate his own in lieu; and thus, in every possible manner collects the notes of his opponents, and pours them back upon themselves, so that if they have been incautious they must necessarily be distressed if not ruined. The general practice, indeed, is that the country agents of the different bankers, if situated near each other, exchange notes weekly; (e. g.) if A. has picked up 10,000 of B.'s notes, and B. has only 5,000 of A.'s, B. must in lieu of the other 5,000 give A. a draft on his constituents, or more commonly on London payable at sight; and if the latter, B.'s correspondents in London must possess assets to enable them to honour this draft. Thus from the course of exchange B.'s constituents instead of being gainers, may, at times, be exposed to a po-

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sitive loss by the circulation of their paper.—Hence also it follows, that one Bank must of necessity be in some measure restrained and regulated by the operations of another; hence the improbability, or rather the impossibility of their embarking in any improper speculations, and hence in a great measure the important fact, that very few bankers indeed, in comparison with other classes of the community become insolvent, or if they do, the loss to the public can seldom be considerable.—3dly, The public at large have a salutary jealousy of the pecuniary abilities of bankers; and this jealousy invariably restricts the circulation of their paper during a time of commercial distress. The same want of confidence in the public which leads bankers on the one hand to limit their discounts, has also on the other hand its effects on the public mind, and leads individuals to refuse the paper of all banks, those of unequivocal responsibility excepted.—Suppose, that I am pressed for money, I will only apply for the bank notes which I can circulate with facility, or of which I cannot doubt my creditor's acceptance. Indeed, Sir, to speak of a banker who does not enjoy the confidence of the public, is almost to express a solecism in language. Such a man is doomed to toil perpetually at the stone of Sisyphus. Nor is it in his power seriously to injure the community; and for this obvious reason, they will not permit him to do so, they will not take his notes.—These, Sir, are some of the reasons which lead me to believe that the circulation of paper in the British Empire, never can produce the evils which some of your correspondents seem to apprehend. Nay, on the contrary, that the amazing facility which it affords to commercial operations has tended to advance, and will continue to promote our wealth and our prosperity, so as to enable our happy Isle still to lift up its head in the ocean as one of the wonders of the world. Presuming to borrow as in some degree applicable, the beautiful idea by which you yourself illustrate another subject in your No. of the 8th Cur. p. 874. I remark, that as there is in the natural world "just horses enough to eat the hay, and hay enough to maintain the horses," so in the commercial world, there will be bills and bonds and bank-notes, while commerce flourishes, and public confidence prevails; and that in proportion as the former are improperly hunted down, the latter will totter and moulder into ruin.—I have said above that the decrease of a paper currency throughout the kingdom, necessarily increased the circulation of that of the Bank of England, and I have also hinted what may

render this abundantly obvious.—The same causes which occasioned a pressure upon the private banks, may scarcely lead them to apply for aid to the great Nucleus of national wealth. Happily for this country, as a tower of strength it was enabled to stand firm. It held forth its protection, and it has done so with success; so that now our difficulties are vanishing, and matters go back to their usual channel; and, I expect soon to hear that the discounts of the Bank of England shall be gradually reduced, and that recourse upon it shall be inversely as the restoration of the commercial capital and confidence of the country. Here however, some may remark, that the last paragraph is a tacit admission that had not the Bank of England been under parliamentary restriction, the bubble would have burst ere now, and our paper currency would have shewn itself in all its deformity. I do admit, Sir, that in the case in question, the interference of parliament was highly expedient; and, I feel perfectly confident that when it ceases to be so, it will no longer exist. Is not the fostering care of parliament necessary for the support of our commerce? Are not the bounties granted by parliament for the importation of some commodities and drawbacks on the exports of others? Is it proper that parliament should interfere in preventing the export of our raw materials, should punish the man who would decoy our artizans; should guard even against the export of our coins, should condemn as a traitor the man who counterfeits it: nay, in many instances, stretch forth its arm to protect the interests of the people against their own infatuation and folly; and, can it be improper at a time of great alarm, that parliament should interfere to preserve our great National Bank from the effects of the timidity of some, and the hoarding avarice of others, so as to maintain its action in the commercial system, in a resemblance to that of the heart, which in the human frame repels the blood into its various minute ramifications, and preserves its life, its health, and its vigour. But, suppose, for a moment, that the treasure of the Bank of England (call it 18 millions sterling) had been left by parliament at the mercy of the public, at the juncture when we expected to measure swords with our enemies on British soil, at the time when all our gold and silver seemed to have fled again to the bowels of the earth; do you really conceive, that a sum which would be little more than a guinea to each inhabitant of this kingdom, could have much ameliorated our situation; or, as of all diseases, panic is among the most infectious, would it not have disappeared with



the rest of our coin? Thank God, Sir, things now begin to wear a different aspect. Our guineas are again returning from their lurking holes; our miserly poltroons feel the loss of their 5 per cent interests, and send the contents of their money bags into circulation.—But I have sometimes heard it argued against paper currency, that the advance in the price of labour consequent (as it is said) on its extension, will raise the price of our manufactures so as to enable other nations to undersell us in foreign markets. If this is founded in truth, it furnishes a strong argument against that depreciation of our paper which is so much spoken of. But, Sir, on the supposition that the inhabitants of this country had in their power to increase the coins of our country, so as to substitute 20 shillings sterling for every 20 shilling note now in circulation; or, in other words, supposing that the astonishing opulence of this country consisted of gold and silver in guineas and shillings, instead of the paper which represents them; I ask, would not the effect on the price of labour be precisely the same? It would beyond a doubt. It is not to be denied, that the increase of wealth has some effect in lessening the quantum of any commodity which the component parts of that wealth usually procure, and the reason is more obvious than we are generally aware of. There are none of your country readers, who (like myself) are in moderate circumstances, that do not dread the residence of two or three of our modern nabobs in their neighbourhood. Why? Because an increase in the rate of wages, and in the price of every country commodity is the consequence. The possessor of immense wealth does not attach the same value to a guinea, that the man does who must earn it by hard labour. When the former hires servants or employs day labourers, he does not *higgle* about a few extra shillings, as the latter is constrained to do. But the menial will not serve, nor will the labourer work for less money to you or to me than they can procure from our opulent neighbour; and hence, perhaps, more than from any other cause the advance in the price of labour in Britain. But, Sir, this is necessary; the infallible attendant on increased opulence, and it is a question perfectly distinct from that which I am now arguing. I do not now inquire how far opulence is or is not morally or politically considered a blessing to a country; nor, do I ask, whether it was better for us that our generals and senators were cincinnate. What I now argue is, that effects precisely

the same would flow from increased opulence, and consequently, our relative situation with respect to foreign countries would be the same, whether this wealth consisted of gold and silver, or (as is the fact) partly of the paper that represents them.—But, I would further inquire, from what quarter it is that we have to apprehend the rivalry in question. Is it from America, Mr. Cobbet? You have resided in that country! Say, does not the wages of a common day labourer there, equal that of the most ingenious mechanics in England. Is this rivalry apprehended from France, from Holland, from any one of the nations of the Continent? What! Is it necessary to explain to you, Sir. Is it necessary to adduce arguments to convince the least intelligent individual in this hitherto highly favoured isle, that the preponderance of Britain in the scale of civilisation, of commerce, of wealth, and of power, depends by no means so much on the value of labour, on her insular situation, on her population, climate, or any similar cause, as on the enterprise, and on the virtues of her inhabitants; on the astonishing extent of her capital, and above all, on having that enterprise and this capital cherished and secured by her free government, and by her mild and equitable laws; laws that under a merciful Providence protect the Sovereign on his throne, while by their benignant influence the humble peasant eats the fruit of his own wine, and sits under his own figtree. It is true, Sir, that attempts have frequently been made to establish commerce on the continent of Europe with partial success. Under the reigns of Henry of Navarre, and Lewis the just, Rouen, and Poitiers, and Nismes, became famous for their manufactures. Under the guardianship of the House of Orange, Holland became a commercial and an opulent state. But, Sir, Lewis the XIVth was able by his own arbitrary fiat to revoke the edict of Nantz, and to banish commerce together with 800,000 of his best subjects, and Holland is now blessed with Gallic fraternity, nor does there appear a shadow of reason to apprehend, that in the presence of the great, the mighty, the puissant Napoleon, commerce will ever dare to raise her humble head. No, Sir, before the nations of Europe can prove the commercial rivals of Britain, they must learn to admire, and they must for ages study to imitate. May Heaven long preserve it. Our British Constitution.—I am, Sir, yours, &c. D. N.

*Ultima Thule, Dec. 28, 1804.*

N. B. Since I wrote the above, I re-

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ceived your No. of the 15th current, in which I find a letter bearing the signature of Crito. The sapient writer appears to be preparing a mine wherewith to blow up the paper currency of the country. He, however, in the outset very shrewdly endeavours to save the lawyer's fees, by asking the opinion of counsel through the medium of the Political Register.—The ingenuity of his argument is striking. This sort of hocus pocus work, as he elegantly calls it, enables the man who yesterday stood behind our chair, to day to excel in magnificence the Howards, the Percys, and the Russels. (i. e.) Paper currency enables the man who was lately in poverty, in a little time to sit in his carriage, to build splendid houses, to purchase extensive demesnes, and to command all the luxuries of life. *Ergo*, paper currency ruins the country!! I could wish much for the sake of my poor native land, that Crito had condescended to instruct us in this conjuring art.

#### ON CRIMINAL JUDICATURE.

SIR,—Montesquieu observes, that a political constitution may be free, and the subject not, and that the subject may be free, and not the constitution. Undoubtedly, the end of all governments ought to be the happiness of the people. The fundamental political laws are the means by which this end is to be accomplished. But as all human contrivances are in their own nature very imperfect, in every complicated political system, however skilfully constructed, and however well adapted it may be in appearance to secure the practical good of those for whose use it is designed, partial disorder and abuse must frequently be produced by the operation of accidental causes. In all those various depositaries of delegated authority to which responsibility is attached, there must exist a portion more or less of power, not subject to the plain and palpable check of fixed laws, but exercised according to the discretion of the individual by whom it is held; and on that account peculiarly liable to be abused, and prevented from its original design by the low and selfish passions of mankind. The control of responsibility can only be of use in extreme cases; it never can operate as an adequate corrective for all the various abuses to which discretionary power is liable.—There are, however, certain dispositions in the human mind, which when properly laid hold of, may be formed into very powerful principles of action, and may be rendered instrumental in regulating

the most delicate parts of the political machine. As a man is created for society, he is disposed by the better principles of his nature to conciliate the good-will of his fellow creatures, and to shun their enmity or contempt. Hence it is that the influence of manners predominate so powerfully in the constitution of society, and from this source also, the general approbation or odium of mankind derives its peculiar power over those who are chosen to fill responsible stations, and who may be placed beyond the control of positive laws. This species of restraint can only exist in its full force under a free constitution, and in an improved state of society. In Britain, not only the general spirit of the civil and political laws, but the peculiar manner of the people, and their high degree of improvement, tend to facilitate the developement of this principle of action, and to open a very wide field for its operation. Accordingly, the influence of popular opinion, though it has no direct share in the constitution, possesses considerable efficiency as an indirect control. It forms, in strict theory, no part of the mechanism, but it is an admirable instrument for regulating its nicest motions, and for counteracting in some degree the effect of those radical imperfections, inherent in the materials of which the machine is constructed. But this restraint even under the fostering influence of the British constitution, is far from being complete, and it only requires a considerable degree of shamelessness and insensibility to the well merited reproaches of mankind, to outrage, even in Britain, the feelings of the people, and to execute measures generally odious. Perhaps in no one point is discretionary power more frequently abused than in the selection of men to fill situations of great trust and responsibility, not so much from an eye to service, as to gratify despicable views of temporary interest, and as the qualities which form the moral and intellectual character, often appear under very dubious lights, a pretext never will be wanting in any case of this sort for keeping out of view the moving principle of action.—The same author to whom I have already alluded, observes, that it is on the excellence of the criminal laws, that the liberty of the subject principally depends. But, however excellent the criminal laws of any country may be, a most important trust must still be left to those who are appointed to give them practical effect. As fatal a blow, may indeed, be levelled at the liberty of the subject, by the choice of bad men to preside over the ad-



ministration of criminal justice, as by a corruption of the laws themselves. The personal character of a man ought to be examined by very severe tests, before the important duties of a judge be committed to his charge. Indeed, the whole course of his professional life ought to be reviewed, and more particularly all the intermediate offices which he has filled, ought to be considered as so many probationary stations on which he is exalted, that the predominant bias of his mind may be more distinctly seen: If a man had at any time, from the innate meanness or depravity of his mind, manifested a disposition to sacrifice the sacred principles of justice to considerations of base expediency, or to fashion or accommodate them to the varying appearance of existing circumstances; if he constantly discovered an inclination to protect in its most wanton excesses, that species of power, which in its natural station is the solid foundation on which the pillars of government must ultimately rest; but which, in its perversion and abuse, leads directly to the establishment of open despotism; if all his sympathies and predilections were alien from the nature of a free constitution; if there were beside, other infallible indications of an intemperate spirit, goaded on by an inherent despotism of character; if he had ever been guilty of any one act of flagrant oppression, which called forth the reprobation of every honest mind, and reduced even his most strenuous eulogists to the humble tone of apology, such a man ought not to receive power over the most worthless animals, much less ought he to be appointed judge of the lives and fortunes of a free people. The baneful effects of conferring offices of trust on those whose previous conduct and character, has afforded strong and general cause of suspicion and jealousy, and who have exhibited dispositions of mind too strongly marked to admit of a charitable interpretation, are deplorable in the extreme. Not only does it stunt the growth of all those moral energies, which are the surest supports of a state, but it tends to disunite talents from virtue, by shutting up the avenues of honourable ambition; if honours and distinctions are conferred on those, who with a blind and stupid rage trample without scruple on the most sacred principles of justice; adieu to that ardour of mind, which kindles at oppression, and rises up by the instinctive impulse of its own excellent nature, the voluntary champion of injured right; adieu to that proud spirit of independence and of honour, which engages the heart and affec-

tions on the side of virtue, which power cannot awe into a base acquiescence in its usurpations, and which, even in its corruption or abuse, never can be rendered directly instrumental in tyrannising over the meanest individual of the human race. Is it not, Sir, by a series of mistakes of this nature, that courts of justice fall at last from their natural elevation, and instead of fostering an attachment to liberty, and to all those manly virtues by which the genuine disciples of liberty are ever distinguished, degenerate at last into nurseries of servility, where men are trained to be the supple tools of their superiors?—We cannot form a correct estimate of the virtues or vices of those eminent personages, who have flourished in different ages of the world, unless we take into our consideration, the influence of the education which they have received, the manners of the age in which they have lived, and the circumstances in which they may have been placed; unless we also make a due allowance for the effect of other accidental causes, in checking or calling forth those elementary passions, by whose peculiar combination the prominencies of any character are formed. It is only by clearing men's actions of the extrinsic encumbrances with which they are connected, by stripping them in a manner, of the husk in which they are involved, that we are enabled to penetrate clearly into their true nature, and to mark those in whom the distinctive lineaments of tyranny are faithfully preserved. It would, for instance, be very unjust to fasten on the memory of Charles I. the odious charge of despotism, because he entertained notions of the regal prerogative inconsistent with a free constitution, without reflecting that the station in which he was placed, disposed him to receive strong prepossessions in favour of the royal power; and, that the education which he received, instead of weakening the force of those pernicious prejudices, rivetted them more strongly on his mind. But there is a radical depravity of heart, an obstinate tendency in the mind to domineer and dragoon, which baffles the correcting influence of accidental causes. It is the pure spirit of mischief transmitted in its primitive malignity through all the successive changes in the manners, laws, and customs of society, like the river which was fabled by the ancients to run through the sea without imbibing the slightest tincture from the surrounding elements. —Had Henry the VIIIth been destined to live in happier times, and to fill an inferior station, he never could have been guilty of those sanguinary excesses into which he was

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hurried by the unlimited indulgence of his passions; but, he would, notwithstanding have exhibited decisive marks of his true character. His system of government would have been founded on force, not on conciliation; he would have been disgusted with the deliberate circuitous movements of civil judicatories, and would have recommended, on the slightest occasions, the direct and rapid march of military law. When questioned as to the nature of his office, fondly casting back a retrospective glance to an age more suitable to his genius and character, he would have carefully picked up all the scattered fragments of tyranny which he could find; these, after being patched together, he would have exhibited to the astonished beholders as a faint image of his authority. When any of his excesses had drawn upon him general odium, he would have sheltered his shivering nakedness from the storm of popular indignation; not in the durable robe of immutable justice, but in the filthy rags and remnants of usurped power. In carrying into practical effect an important alteration in any political constitution, it requires a comprehensive, discriminating mind, skillfully to adapt new institutions to the system of which they are intended to form a part; to work them in a manner into the contexture and constitution of the original fabric. In all those changes and improvements, which tend to give additional energy to a government by concentrating its scattered parts into greater simplicity of construction, a variety of inferior and collateral depositories of authority, must necessarily be rendered useless, and the relations of subordination must be partially broken. One principal object with those who preside and direct, ought therefore, to be, to establish those relations on the same footing as formerly, and to guard against the growth of any unnatural, anomalous tyranny in the state, by fixing a regular channel of communication between the source of authority, and its most remote ramifications. If any of the mutilated fragments of power be allowed to lie scattered about, great confusion and uncertainty will immediately ensue, and they will be scrambled for and seized by those petty tyrants, who lie in wait for every opportunity to increase their authority, and to draw to themselves a variety of useless and pernicious prerogatives. Hence they are enabled to give the semblance of law and justice, to acts of the basest oppression, and to protect themselves with a strong line of powers and privileges from the consequences of their misconduct and delinquency. Of all the enemies to the liberties of the people,

they are the most formidable. They take their aim from a covert; they walk about with concealed arms; they are the odious reptiles of arbitrary power, who lurk amid the ruins and rubbish of the political edifice, from whence they issue out to harass and pollute the land with their filthy ravages.—These general speculations, I shall conclude with the following quere. If those who publish seditious doctrines are condemned to a long exile, what punishment is adequate to the offence of those, who are guilty of a practical satire on the blessings of a free government?—A SPECULATOR.

*Edinburgh, Jan. 2, 1805.*

#### PUBLIC PAPERS.

WAR WITH SPAIN.—*Declaration on the Part of the King of England, laid before Parliament, and published on Thursday, the 24th of January, 1805.*

From the moment that hostilities had commenced between Great Britain and France, a sufficient ground of war against Spain, on the part of Great Britain, necessarily followed from the treaty of St. Ildefonso, if not disclaimed by Spain.—That treaty in fact identified Spain with the Republican Government of France, by a virtual acknowledgment of unqualified vassalage, and by specific stipulations of unconditional offence.—By the articles of that treaty Spain covenanted to furnish a stated contingent of naval and military force for the prosecution of any war in which the French Republic might think proper to engage. She specifically surrendered any right or pretension to inquire into the nature, origin, or justice of that war. She stipulated, in the first instance, a contingent of troops and ships, which, of itself, comprised no moderate proportion of the means at her disposal; but in the event of this contingent being at any time found insufficient for the purposes of France, she further bound herself to put into a state of activity the utmost force, both by sea and land, that it should be in her power to collect. She covenanted that this force should be at the disposal of France, to be employed conjointly or separately for the annoyance of the common enemy; thus submitting her entire power and resources to be used as the instruments of French ambition and aggression, and to be applied in whatever proportion France might think proper, for the avowed purpose of endeavouring to subvert the government and destroy the national existence of Great Britain.—The character of such a treaty gave Great Britain, an incontestible right to declare to Spain, that unless



she decidedly renounced the treaty, or gave assurances that she would not perform the obligations of it, she would not be considered as a neutral power.—This right, however, for prudential reasons, and from motives of forbearance and tenderness towards Spain, was not exercised in its full extent: and, in consequence of assurances of a pacific disposition on the part of the Spanish government, his Majesty did not, in the first instance, insist on a distinct and formal renunciation of the treaty. It does not appear that any express demand of succour had been made by France before the Month of July, one thousand eight hundred and three; and on the first notification of the war, his Majesty's minister at Madrid was led to believe, in consequence of communications which passed between him and the Spanish government, that his Catholic Majesty did not consider himself as necessarily bound by the mere fact of the existence of a war between Great Britain and France, without subsequent explanation and discussion, to fulfil the stipulations of the treaty of St. Ildephonso, though the articles of that treaty would certainly give rise to a very different interpretation. In the month of October a convention was signed, by which Spain agreed to pay to France a certain sum monthly in lieu of naval and military succours which they had stipulated by the treaty to provide, but of the amount of this sum, or of the nature of any other stipulations which that convention might contain, no official information whatever was given.—It was immediately stated by his Majesty's minister at Madrid to the Spanish government, that a subsidy as large as that which they were supposed to have engaged to pay to France, far exceeded the bounds of forbearance: that it could only meet with a temporary connivance, as if it was continued, it might prove in fact a greater injury than any other hostility. In reply to these remonstrances, it was represented as an expedient to gain time, and assurances were given which were confirmed by circumstances, which came to his Majesty's knowledge from other quarters, that the disposition of the Spanish government would induce them to extricate themselves from this engagement, if the course of events should admit of their doing so with safety.—When his Majesty had first reason to believe that such a convention was concluded, he directed his minister at Madrid to declare that his forbearing to consider Spain as an enemy must depend in some degree upon the amount of the succours, and upon her maintaining a perfect neutrality in all other respects; but that it would be im-

possible for him to consider a permanent payment, to the amount of that which was stated to have been in agitation, in any other light than as a direct subsidy of war. His Majesty's envoy was directed, therefore, first to protest against the convention, as a violation of neutrality, and a justifiable cause of war; secondly, to declare, that our abstaining from hostilities must depend upon its being only a temporary measure, and that we must be at liberty to consider a perseverance in it as a cause of war; thirdly, that the entrance of any French troops into Spain must be refused; fourthly, that any naval preparation must be a great cause of jealousy, and any attempt to give naval assistance to France an immediate cause of war; fifthly, that the Spanish ports must remain open to our commerce, and that our ships of war must have equal treatment with those of France. His Majesty's minister was also instructed, if any French troops entered Spain, or if he received authentic information of any naval armaments preparing for the assistance of France, to leave Madrid, and to give immediate notice to our naval commanders, that they might proceed to hostilities without the delay that might be occasioned by a reference home.—The execution of these instructions produced a variety of discussions; during which his Majesty's minister told Mr. Cevallos, in answer to his question, whether a continuance of such pecuniary succours to France would be considered as a ground of war, and whether he was authorised to declare it? that he was so authorised, and that war would be the infallible consequence.—It was, however, still thought desirable by his Majesty to protract, if possible, the decision of this question; and it was therefore stated in the instructions to his minister at Madrid, that as the subsidy was represented by the Spanish government to be merely a temporary measure, his Majesty might still continue to overlook it for a time; but that his decision in this respect must depend upon knowing the precise nature of all the stipulations between Spain and France, and upon the Spanish government being determined to cause their neutrality to be respected in all other particulars. That until these questions were answered in a satisfactory manner, and the convention communicated to him, he could give no positive answer whether he would make the pecuniary succours a cause of war or not.—Before the receipt of these instructions, dated January 21, 1804, the report of some naval armaments in the ports of Spain had occasioned a fresh correspondence between his Majesty's minister and the Spa-

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nish government. In one of the notes presented by the former, he declares, that if the King was forced to begin a war, he would want no other declaration than what he had already made. The answers of the Spanish government were at first of an evasive nature; his Majesty's minister closed the correspondence on his part by a note delivered on the Eighteenth February, in which he declares that all further forbearance on the part of England must depend upon the cessation of all naval armaments, and a prohibition of the sale of prizes in their ports; and unless these points were agreed to without modification, he had orders to leave Madrid. On the second of these points a satisfactory answer was given, and orders issued accordingly; on the first a reference was made to former declarations. To the question about disclosing the treaty with France no satisfactory answer was ever given. As however no naval preparations appeared to be proceeding at that period in the ports of Spain, the matter was allowed to remain there for a time.—In the month of July, one thousand eight hundred and four, the government of Spain gave assurances of faithful and settled neutrality, and disavowed any orders to arm in their ports; yet in the subsequent month, when these assurances were recent, and a confident reliance reposed in them, the British Chargé d'Affaires received advice from the admiral commanding his Majesty's ships off the port of Ferrol, that reinforcements of soldiers and sailors had arrived through Spain for the French fleets at Toulon and Ferrol. On this intelligence two notes were presented to the Spanish ministers, but no answer was received to either of them. Towards the end of the Month of September, information was received in London from the British admiral stationed off Ferrol, that orders had actually been given by the court of Madrid, for arming, without loss of time, at that port, four ships of the line, two frigates, and other smaller vessels; that (according to his intelligence) similar orders have been given at Carthagena and Cadiz, and particularly that three first rate ships of the line were directed to sail from the last mentioned port; and as an additional proof of hostile intentions, that orders had been given to arm the packets as in time of war.—Here then appeared a direct and unequivocal violation of the terms on which the continuance of peace had been acquiesced in; previous notice having been given to the Spanish government, that a state of war would be the immediate consequence of such a measure, his Majesty on this event stood almost pledged

to an instant commencement of hostilities; the King however preferred a persevering adherence to the system of moderation so congenial to his disposition: he resolved to leave still an opening for accommodation, if Spain should be still allowed the liberty to adopt the course prescribed by a just sense of her own interests and security. It is here worthy of remark, that the groundless and ungrateful imputations thrown out against his Majesty's conduct in the Spanish manifesto, are built upon the foundation of this forbearance alone. Had his Majesty exercised, without reserve, his just rights of war, the representations so falsely asserted, and so insidiously dwelt upon, could not have been even stated under any colourable pretext: the indulgence, therefore, which postponed the actual state of war, was not only misrepresented, but transformed into a ground of complaint, because the forbearance extended to the aggressors was not carried to a dangerous and inadmissible extreme. In consequence of intelligence above stated, directions were sent to his Majesty's minister at Madrid, to make representations and remonstrances to the Spanish court, to demand explanations relative to the existing conventions between Spain and France; and, above all, to insist that the naval armaments in their ports should be placed on the same footing as they were previously to the commencement of hostilities between Great Britain and France: And he was further directed, explicitly to state to the Spanish government, that his Majesty felt a duty imposed upon him of taking, without delay, every measure of precaution; and, particularly, of giving orders to his admiral off the port of Ferrol to prevent any of the Spanish ships of war sailing from that port, or any additional ships of war from entering it.—No substantial redress, no satisfactory explanation, was afforded in consequence of these repeated representations; whilst, under the cover of his Majesty's forbearance, the enemy had received considerable remittances of treasure together with the facility of procuring other supplies.—Every circumstance of the conduct of Spain was peculiarly calculated to excite the attention of the British government—the removal of Spanish ships out of their docks, to make room for the accommodation of the men of war of France—the march of French troops and seamen through the Spanish territory—the equipment of naval armaments at Ferrol—the consideration that the junction of this armament with the French ships already in that harbour, would create a decided superiority of numbers over his Majesty's squadron cruiz-



ing off that port—the additional naval exertions, and the consequent increase of expense which this conduct of Spain necessarily imposed upon Great Britain. All these together required those precautions, both of representation and action, to which his Majesty had immediate recourse. While official notice was given of his Majesty's intention to adopt those necessary measures, the Spanish government was at the same time assured, that his Majesty still felt an earnest desire to maintain a good understanding with Spain; but that the continuance of such a state of things must be subject to the condition of abstaining, on their part, from all hostile preparations, and on making without hesitation or reserve, that full and explicit disclosure of the nature and extent of the subsisting engagements with France, which had hitherto been so frequently and so fruitlessly demanded.—The precautions adopted by his Majesty were such only as he deemed indispensably necessary to guard against the augmentation by Spain of her means of naval preparation during the discussion, and against the possible consequences of the safe arrival of the expected American treasure in the Spanish ports; an event which has more than once, in former times, become the epoch of the termination of discussions, and of the commencement of hostility on the part of Spain.—The orders issued by his Majesty, on this occasion, to the admirals commanding his fleets, afford the most striking example of a scrupulous and indulgent forbearance; the most strict limitation was given, as to the extent and object of the measures proposed; and the execution of those orders was guarded with the strongest injunctions to avoid, by every means consistent with attainment of their object, any act of violence or hostility against the dominions or subjects of his Catholic Majesty. The hostile preparations in the harbour of Ferrol rendered it necessary, in the first instance, that a reinforcement should be added to the squadron cruising off that port; and orders were at the same time conveyed to the British admirals, to send intimation to the Spanish government of the instructions they had received, and of their determination in consequence to resist, under the present circumstances, the sailing either of the French or Spanish fleets, if any attempt should be made by either of them.—His Majesty's pleasure was at the same time signified, that they were not to detain, in the first instance, any ship belonging to his Catholic Majesty, sailing from a port of Spain; but to require the commander of such ship to return directly

to the port from whence she came, and only, in the event of his refusing to comply with such requisition, to detain and send her to Gibraltar or to England.—Further directions were given not to detain any Spanish homeward-bound ships of war, unless they should have treasure on board, nor merchant ships of that nation, however laden on any account whatsoever. That in the prosecution of those measures of precaution, many valuable lives should have been sacrificed, is a subject of much regret to his Majesty, who laments it as an event produced alone by an unhappy concurrence of circumstances, but which can in no degree affect the merits of the case. The question of the just principle and due exercise of his Majesty's right, rests upon every foundation of the laws of nature and of nations, which enjoin and justify the adoption of such measures as are requisite for defence and the prevention of aggression.—It remains only further to observe, that if any additional proof were requisite of the wisdom and necessity of precautionary measures, that proof would be found even in the declaration relied upon in the manifesto of Spain, in which its government now states itself to have contemplated from the beginning of the war, the necessity of making itself a party to it, in support of the pretensions of France, expressly declaring, that "Spain and Holland, who treated conjointly with France at Amiens, and whose interests and political relations were so closely connected with her, must have with difficulty refrained from taking part against the injuries and insults offered to their ally."—It will further appear, by a reference to the dates and results of the several representations made by his Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at the court of Spain, that the detention of the Spanish treasure-ships never was in question during the discussions which preceded his departure from Madrid. That ground of complaint therefore, which has since been so much relied upon, formed no part of the motive of the previous hostile character so strongly manifested by the Spanish court in their mode of treating the points in discussion, nor (as will appear in the sequel) of the final rupture of the negotiation at Madrid.—On the twenty-sixth of October, one thousand eight hundred and four, his Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presented a note to the Spanish minister, in which the following conditions were insisted upon, as preliminary to the appointment of a minister from Great-Britain, who might treat of the adjustment of other matters which remained for discussion. The conditions were three:



first, that the orders given at Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagena, should be countermanded, as well for the equipment of ships of war in any of those ports, as for their removal from one of those ports to another. Secondly, that not only the present armaments should be discontinued, but that the establishment of ships of war in the different ports should be replaced on the footing on which they stood at the commencement of hostilities between England and France. Thirdly, that a full disclosure should be made of the existing engagements, and of the future intentions of Spain with respect to France. From the period above-mentioned to the second of November, several official notes passed between his Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires and the Spanish minister, consisting, with little variation in their tenour, of urgent demands of satisfaction on the one side, and of evasive and unsatisfactory replies on the other. After repeated delays and reiterated applications, his Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires received his passports on the seventh of November, and departed from Madrid on the fourteenth of that month. During the whole of this negotiation, no mention was made of the detention of the Spanish treasure ships, nor does it any where appear that an account had been received at Madrid of that transaction. It is evident therefore, notwithstanding the attempt made by the Spanish court to avail itself of that event, in the Manifesto which has been since published, that the state of war must equally have arisen between Great Britain and Spain, had the detention never taken place, and that, in point of fact, the rupture ultimately took place upon grounds distinct from, and totally unconnected with, that measure.—The leading circumstances which characterize the reiterated abuse of his Majesty's moderation, were each of them of a nature to have exhausted any less settled system of lenity and forbearance. Succours afforded to his enemies; explanations refused or evaded, after repeated demands; conditions violated, after distinct notice that on them depended the continuance of peace. Such has been the conduct of the Spanish court; and it is, under these circumstances, that his Majesty finds the domineering influence of France exerted, and the Spanish nation in a state of declared and open war.—His Majesty appeals with confidence to all Europe for the acknowledgment of his exemplary moderation in the whole course of these transactions. His Majesty feels with regret the necessity which places him in a state of hostility with Spain; and would with heartfelt satisfaction observe, on the

part of that country, the assumption of a more dignified sense of national importance, and a more independent exercise of sovereign rights.—His Majesty would indeed be most happy to discover in the councils of Spain a reviving sense of those ancient feelings and honourable propensities which have at all times been so congenial to the Spanish character, and which, in better times, have marked the conduct of its government. His Majesty will, on his part, eagerly embrace the first opportunity, thus offered, of resuming a state of peace and confidence with a nation which has so many ties of common interest to connect it with Great Britain, and which he has hitherto been ever disposed to regard with sentiments of the utmost consideration and esteem.

WAR WITH SPAIN.—*Address of His Excellency the Prince of Peace, Generalissimo of his Catholic Majesty's forces, to the Fleets, Armies, and People of Spain. Dated, Madrid, the 10th of December, 1804.*

The King has condescended to submit to me, as generalissimo of the royal armies, the conduct of the war commenced with Great Britain; and he commands, that all the principal officers of his dominions correspond privately with me on the subject connected with this event. To comply with the terms of the confidence reposed in me, and to fulfil the honourable duties enjoined me in the supreme authority over his gallant troops with which I am invested, it is expedient that I call into activity my loyal zeal in his cause, and adopt the most effectual means to discharge this high and important office.—It is universally known, that when we were in a state of profound peace with England, hostilities were commenced by that country, by the capture of three frigates; one was destroyed in the contest; a regiment of infantry destined for Minorca was made prisoners; many vessels laden with grain were taken; and others, under the burthen of one hundred tons, were destroyed. When were these robberies, these acts of treachery and assassination, committed? When our Sovereign admitted the ships of that nation to a free and undisturbed commerce, and gave the necessary supplies to their ships of war. What profligacy and degradation in the one; what honour and dignity in the other. On the view of this perfidy, is there a Spaniard whose indignation will not be excited? Is there a soldier who will not grasp the weapon of destruction? Brave seamen, three hundred of your brethren have had their mangled members scattered to the winds; one thousand are de-



prived of the light of heaven, in the dungeons of your enemies. Valiant soldiers, an equal number of your companions in arms are deprived of the swords they knew how to wield, and are carried to a remote island where they will either perish with hunger, or be constrained to unite with the ranks of the detested foe. Remember, then, your sacred obligations. Generous Spaniards, a few innocent and defenceless fishermen are reduced to the lowest step of human misery, and their afflicted wives and deserted offspring implore your pity, and demand your protection. In fine, thousands of families, expecting support from the wisdom of the state, in a season of famine, are brutally deprived of the subsistence provided for them, and exclaim, with the voice of thunder—Vengeance! Vengeance! Let us then, my countrymen, obey; the King expects it, and honour and justice require it at our hands. If the English have forgotten that the blood which circulates in the veins of Spaniards is the same which flowed in the breasts of those who triumphed over the Carthaginian, the Roman, the Vandal, and the Saracen, it is time that the recollection should be revived: it is time to convince them that we will preserve the fame of our ancestors unsullied, and shew to them that we will perform our duty to posterity, if it require that our ranks should be thinned to add to the glorious catalogue of Castilian heroism. If these distant islanders have attributed our desire to preserve tranquillity within our borders to lamentable weakness, or to dishonourable fear, let them at least be taught that the latter can never disgrace the bosom of a Spaniard, glowing with all the ardent and liberal impressions peculiar to his country. Quickly will we teach them, that a loyal, virtuous, and brave people, attached to religion, and enamoured of true glory, can never be insulted with impunity, much less can it endure an instance of sanguinary violence directed against its dignity and independence. If the English, unmindful of the principles of humanity respected among civilized nations, abandoning all shame and remorse, have only sought to obtain possession of our treasures, which we should have peaceably delivered to them, had they been entitled to the property, we will recall to their memory a fact which we trusted had been universally acknowledged—that the abuse of power, the violation of public right, and the mad excesses of despotism, have ever been the awful presage of the fall of Empires. Let them hide their dishonoured heads; let them tremble in the contemplation of this ill-gotten wealth; let them shudder before the

bloody victims of their aggression; and let an eternal mark of infamy be impressed, and universal detestation be excited for these examples of public atrocity. — Valiant Spaniards! the nobleness of your character no longer admits you to be inactive witnesses of these disgraceful scenes. The love of our King for his people is perfectly known, and leaves no doubt that his numerous vassals will coincide in his wishes, and gratify his expectations. To arms, then, my fellow soldiers and countrymen, and engage in the war in the way most likely to hurl a terrible destruction upon our enemies; but while we spread the terrors of battle, let us not, in imitation of our enemies, desert those general maxims of humanity, which are respected by all regular governments. In order that the Chiefs of the State may proceed in this important business with the energy which the occasion requires, and the King commands, I proclaim, in his royal name, that if the success of any enterprise should not be equal to the wisdom by which it is planned, and the gallantry with which it is executed, they will not be considered responsible for the event: but they will be liable to the consequences, if they do not put in activity the full extent of the resources with which they are entrusted. Nations not provided with the means with which we are supplied, and placed in situations much more critical, have known so well how to economise their limited powers, as to make that people which dared to trample on their rights, feel the effects of their resentment. Fan the public ardour into general conflagration; avail yourselves of the magnanimity of a whole country, and prodigies will lose their character, and become familiar. — Under the present circumstances, it becomes the governors of the provinces to spread the generous spirit of enthusiasm amongst the troops under their orders; it behoves the venerable dignitaries of the Church, and the Civil Officers in the various political departments, to animate all orders and ranks of men to assert the honour of their King and Country, by the powerful influence of example, and by the attractive charms of eloquence. — In cases out of the ordinary current of events, it will be expedient to recur to means equal to the occasion; and each province of the Empire will, according to its peculiar situation, vary in the efforts it directs to annoy the common enemy. Learn how to blend wisdom with patriotism, and let every commander, and every district, in obedience to him, present before the Sovereign and Citizens of the State, and before the eyes of all Europe, deeds worthy of the country to



which they belong. When any opportunity be afforded of destroying the foe, wait not for orders from a distant officer of government: let not delay diminish the impressions of nascent valour, and let not the natural courage of man be frittered away in the collision of idle formalities.—Contemplate contraband commerce as the highest crime; it is conducive only to satisfy the avarice of our enemies; the manufactures they offer you, are prepared by the reeking hands of those who are bathed in the blood of your fathers, and your brethren. Impress all around you with a sense of horror, at the practice of this nefarious intercourse; and when it is universally felt, when not a Spaniard will disgrace himself by this pernicious connexion, when Europe shall understand her genuine interests; and every port of the Continent shall be closed upon these intruders, then will our vengeance be complete: the insupportable arrogance of the Islanders will be humbled; they will be lost amid the chaos of their own ruins; and they will be recognized only as the violators of public right, and as the tyrants of the Ocean.—May the spirit here applauded be that of the whole nation; may we all of us readily sacrifice our private indulgence to the general cause; and if there should be an insulated character among us not animated by this noble disposition, may he catch the flame of patriotism from his associates, and not disgrace the Spanish name by frigidity and indifference. The age and infirmities of some will not permit them to take a personal part in this glorious enterprize, but they may by their opulence, or by their counsel, conduce to the general design; and this his Majesty expects, and I implore of them; and thus, by availing ourselves of every resource with which God and nature have furnished us, the effects of our indignation will be terrible to our enemies. In fine, if any particular Member of the State should wish exclusively to undertake some scheme which he thinks likely to annoy the English, and for which he shall require the assistance of government, let him communicate his project to me, and I will provide him with the necessary means, if his purpose should be so well formed as to conduce to the injury of Britain, and the glory of Spain.

(Signed) THE PRINCE OF PEACE.

#### FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

*FRENCH ANNUAL EXPOSÉ, at the Opening of the Session of the Legislative Body at Paris, on the 26th of December, 1804.*

#### PREPARATORY CEREMONIES.

At eleven in the morning the members of

the legislative body, in their ceremonial dresses, repaired to the hall of their sittings. The ceremony of the opening of the session for the year, had rendered some changes necessary in the interior distribution of the hall. The estrade of the throne had been established upon and before the ordinary tribune of the president; some of the orators and secretaries of the legislative body on the top of the soubassement. The ascent was by two flights of steps, placed on each side. The throne, elevated five steps above the estrade, was placed under a palm-tree, on the trunk of which were suspended the arms of the Emperor. The throne was composed of two props in the form of two pedestals, on which were placed two Genii, symbols of justice and strength, supporting a crown above the head of his Majesty. Over the throne was a canopy bespangled with bees and stars, and an eagle reposing on his thunderbolts. Opposite the throne, in the tribune of the constituted authorities, was a canopy for her Majesty the Empress, and places for the Princesses. The legislative body had yesterday appointed, in a private sitting, a deputation of 25 members to receive this day his Majesty the Emperor. At half-past eleven the members of the tribunate, council of state, and the twelve deputies of the conservative senate, entered the hall, and took their places. At twelve, a discharge of artillery having announced the arrival of the Emperor, the deputation, with the president at its head, set out to meet his Majesty.—The procession shortly entered the hall, whilst martial music was heard on every side; all the legislators rose up. Those of the deputation went back to their places. The Emperor ascended his throne, and all those who accompanied him sat down to the right and left in those places assigned them. On each side of the throne, on the first step underneath it, were placed the princes and dignitaries; on the second range of steps beneath, on the right, sat the ministers; on the left the grand officers of the Empire; in the front of the steps, upon stools, were the grand chamberlain and grand equerry; to the right the grand master of the ceremonies; behind the Emperor, and standing, the grand marshal, the master of the hunt, the colonels, general of the guard, and the aide-de-camp; at the two angles of the ballustrade were the two masters of the ceremonies; the pages were on the two flights of steps, and at the bottom of the estrade were the heralds at arms. In front, in the circular part forming the first rank of the Amphitheatre, were placed the deputation, composed of twelve senators; upon the two next



seats, to the right, were the councillors of state, and to the left, the tribunes; on the remaining seats of the Amphitheatre sat the members of the legislative body, in the centre of whom, and in the front of the throne, was the president, on a particular seat; on his side were the questors, and behind him two ushers. All the persons present being seated and covered, Prince Joseph, the grand elector, quitted the right of the Emperor, advanced towards the ballustrade, and asked of his Majesty permission to administer the oath to the members of the legislative body. A questor then called the legislators, who successively pronounced aloud, standing: "I swear obedience to the constitutions of the Empire, and fidelity to the Emperor." The appeal terminated, the Emperor rose, the legislators uncovered themselves, and his Majesty delivered the following

## IMPERIAL SPEECH.

Deputies from the departments to the legislative body, tribunes, and members of my council of state: I am come, gentlemen, to preside at the opening of your session. My anxious desire is, to impress a more imposing and august character on your proceedings; yes, princes, magistrates, soldiers, citizens, we have all of us, in the career we have to run, but one object—the interest of the country. If this throne, to which Providence and the will of the nation have raised me, be dear in my eyes, it is because that throne can alone defend and maintain the most sacred interests of the French people. Unsupported by a vigorous and paternal government, France would have still to fear the return of those calamities by which she has been afflicted. The weakness of the supreme power is the deepest misfortune of nations. As a soldier or First Consul, I entertained but one thought; as Emperor, I am influenced by no other—and that is, every thing that contributes to the prosperity of France. I have had the good fortune to illustrate France by victories, to consolidate her by treaties, to rescue her from civil broils, and revive among her inhabitants the influence of morals, of social order, and of religion. Should death not surprise me in the midst of my labours, I fondly hope I may transmit to posterity a durable impression, that must serve as an example or reproach to my successors. The minister of the interior will submit to you a statement of the situation of the Empire. The deputation from my council of state will present to you the different objects that are to occupy the legislature. I have given instructions that there be laid before you the accounts which my

ministers have given me of their respective departments. I am fully satisfied with the prosperous state of our finances: whatever may be the expenditure, it is covered by the revenue. How extensive soever have been the preparations imposed upon us by the exigencies of the war in which we are engaged, I call upon my people for no new sacrifice.—It would have been highly gratifying to me, on so solemn an occasion, to see the blessings of peace diffused over the world; but the political principles of our enemies, their recent conduct towards Spain, but too strongly speak the difficulties that oppose it. I am not anxious to enlarge the territory of France, but to assert its integrity. I feel no ambition to exert a wider stretch of influence in Europe; but not to descend from that which I have acquired. No state shall be incorporated with the Empire; but I shall not sacrifice my rights, or the ties that bind me to the states that I have created.—In bestowing the crown upon me, my people entered into an engagement to exert every effort which circumstances may require, in order to preserve unsullied that splendour which is necessary for their prosperity, and indispensable for their glory, as well as for mine. I am full of confidence in the energy of the nation, and in the sentiments it entertains for me. Its dearest interests are the constant object of my solicitude.—Deputies from the departments of the legislative body, tribunes, and members of my council of state: your conduct, gentlemen, during the preceding session, the zeal with which you glow for your country, your attachment to my person, I hold as pledges of the assistance for which I call upon you, and which, I trust, I shall receive from you during the course of the present session.

*In the sitting of the 31st of December, the President read the following Message.*

At the Palace of the Tuilleries, 10th Nivôse, year 13.—Napoleon Emperor of the French. We have nominated and do nominate, Messrs. Champagny, Minister of the Interior; Regnaud and Lacuée, Councillors of State, to repair to the Legislative Body this day, 10th Nivôse, and there make the statement of the situation of the Empire. By the Emperor, (Signed)—NAPOLEON.—The Secretary of State, (Signed)—H. B. MARET.

## EXPOSÉ.

Mr. Champagny.—"Gentlemen, In consequence of the nomination of which information has just been given to you, I am going to have the honour of stating to you the situation of the French Empire.—The



interior situation of France is at this day what it was in the calmest times; no movement which can alarm the public tranquillity; no crime which belongs to the remembrance of the revolution; every where useful undertakings, every where the improvement of public and private property attest the progress of confidence and of security.—The leaven of opinion no longer sharpens the spirits; the sentiments of the general interest, the principles of social order, better known and more refined, have attached all hearts to the common prosperity. This is what all the administrations proclaim; this is what the Emperor has witnessed in all the departments he has travelled through; this is what has just been demonstrated in the most striking manner. All the armies have seen themselves at once separated from their generals, all the military corps from their chiefs; the superior tribunals, deprived of their first magistrates; the public ministry, of its first organs; the churches of their principal pastors; the towns, the countries, simultaneously quitted by every one who has power and influence over men's minds; the people every where abandoned to their genius; and the people have every where shown themselves desirous of order and of the laws.—At the same moment the Sovereign Pontiff travelled through France. From the banks of the Po to the borders of the Seine, he has every where been the object of a religious homage rendered him by that immense majority, who, faithful to the ancient doctrine, see a common father and the centre of the common belief in him whom all Europe reveres as a sovereign, raised to the throne by his piety and his virtues.—A plot laid by an implacable Government, was going to plunge France into the abyss of civil wars and of anarchy. At the discovery of that horrible plot, all France was moved; inquietudes ill laid asleep, were again awakened, and in every mind was at once found anew, principles which have been those of all wise men, and which were constantly ours before error and weakness had alienated men's minds, and guilty intrigues had misled their opinions.—The nation had experienced that power divided was without accord and without strength; it had been made sensible that intrusted for a time, it was only precarious, and permitted neither long labours nor long thoughts; that intrusted for the life of a single man, it grew weak with him, and left after him only chances of discord and of anarchy; it was convinced in fine that there were safety, for great nations, only in hereditary power; that it alone secured their political life, and em-

braced in its duration generations and ages. —The senate was, as it should be, the organ of the common inquietude. Soon burst forth that wish to see the power hereditary which dwelt in all hearts truly French; it was proclaimed by the electoral colleges, by the armies, the council of state, magistrates, the most enlightened men were consulted, and their answer was unanimous.—The necessity of hereditary power in a state so vast as France, had been long since perceived by the First Consul. In vain had he resisted the force of principles, in vain had he tried to establish a system of election which might perpetuate public authority, and transmit it without danger and without troubles.—Public inquietudes, the hopes of our enemies, accused his work. His death was to be the ruin of his labours. It was till this term that foreign jealousy, and the spirit of discord and anarchy waited for us. Reason, sentiment, experience dictated equally to all Frenchmen that there was no certain transmission of power but that which was effected without interval, that there was no tranquil succession but that which was regulated by the laws of nature.—When such motives supported such pressing wishes, the determination of the First Consul could not be doubtful. He resolved then to accept for himself and for two of his brothers after him, the load which was imposed on him by the necessity of circumstances.—From his meditations ripened by conferences with the members of the senate, by discussions in the councils, by the observations of the wisest men, was formed a series of dispositions which fixes the inheritance of the imperial throne;—which assigns to the princes their rights and their duties;—which promises to the heir of the empire an education regulated by the laws, and such that he will be worthy of his high destinies;—which designates those who, in case of minority, will be called to the regency, and marks the limits of their power;—which places between the throne and the citizens, dignities and offices accessible to all, encouragements and recompences of the public virtues;—which give to men honoured with great distinctions, or invested with great authority, judges sufficiently great to bend neither before their authority, nor before their distinctions;—which gives to crimes against the public safety and the interest of the empire, judges essentially attached to the safety of the empire and to its interests;—which places more lustre and more weight in the functions of the legislator, more development and more extent in the public discussion of the laws;—which recalls the tribunals and



their judgments to those ancient denominations which had obtained the respect of ages;—which guarantees in fine the rights of the Prince and of the people, by oaths, the eternal guardians of all interest. —These dispositions were decreed by the *Senatus Consultum* of the 28th of Floreal last: the French people have manifested their free and independent will; they have expressed their wish that the imperial dignity should be hereditary in the direct, legitimate, and adoptive descendants of Napoleon Buonaparté, in the direct and legitimate descendants of Joseph Buonaparté, in the direct and legitimate descendants of Louis Buonaparté. —At that moment, Napoleon was, by the most just of titles, Emperor of the French; no other act was necessary to ascertain his rights and consecrate his authority. —But he wished to restore to France her ancient forms, to recal among us those institutions which the Divinity seems to have inspired, and to impress upon the beginning of his reign the seal of religion itself. To give to the French a striking proof of his paternal tenderness, the Chief of the Church has been willing to lend his ministry to this august ceremony. —What a deep and lasting impression it has left in the mind of the Emperor and in the remembrance of the nation! What conversations for future races! and what a subject of admiration for Europe. —Napoleon prostrate at the foot of the altars which he has just raised; the Sovereign Pontiff imploring upon France and upon him the celestial benedictions, and in his wishes for the felicity of one nation, embracing the felicity of all nations! —Pastors and priests lately divided uniting with his supplications their gratitude and their voice! —The senators, the legislators, the tribunes, magistrates, warriors, the administrators of the people and those who preside over their assemblies, confounding together their opinions, their hopes and their wishes; sovereigns, princes, ambassadors, struck with the grand spectacle of France again seated upon her ancient foundations; and, by her repose, securing the repose of their country! —In the midst of this pomp, and under the look of the Eternal, Napoleon pronouncing the immutable oath which secures the integrity of the empire, the stability of property, the perpetuity of institutions, the respect for the laws and the happiness of the nation. —The oath of Napoleon will be for ever the terror of the enemies and the buckler of the French. If our frontiers are attacked, it will be repeated at the head of our armies, and our frontiers will no longer dread a foreign invasion. —

It will be present to the memory of the delegates of authority, it will remind them of the end of their labours and the rule of their duties; and though it may not guarantee their administration from some errors, it will insure the prompt reparation of them. —A project of a criminal code, finished for these two years past has been submitted to the censure of the tribunals, and is now undergoing a final discussion in the council of state. —The code of procedure and the code of commerce are still in the same state the labours of last year left them in. More urgent cares have called on the Emperor, and it is one of his maxims to propose to the deliberations of the legislators, those projects of laws alone which have been ripened by long and wise discussions. —The schools of legislation are about to open; inspectors are nominated who will enlighten public teaching, and prevent its degenerating into vain and sterile proofs; the lyceums, the secondary schools are filling with a youth eager for instruction. —Fontainebleau has already sent forth military men, who are remarked in our armies for their soldierly appearance, their knowledge, and their respect for discipline. —The polytechnic school peoples with useful hands, our arsenals, our ports and our workshops. —At Compiègne, the school of arts and trades obtains every day new successes. That which is to be formed upon the borders of la Vendée, is expected there with impatience, and will shortly be in complete activity. —Prizes have been decreed to sciences, to letters and to arts, and in a period of ten years, assigned to labours that H. M. wishes to recompence, he has a right to expect that French genius will bring forth new master-pieces. —In the department of bridges and highways, the works begun have been carried on with constancy, others are in contemplation, and every year prepares for the following years, new schemes for the prosperity of the state. But the intemperance of the seasons had deceived the foresight and the zeal of administration; rains and torrents have injured the roads more rapidly than we have been able to repair them, some labours have been destroyed, others have been for a moment suspended, great calamities have afflicted some departments, particularly that of the Rhine and Moselle. A judicious prefect, interpreter of the intentions of the Emperor, has presented the first succour to those unhappy men who have been the victims of it. H. M. has re-animated their courage by his presence, and has consoled them by his benefits. —The scourge of contagion has afflicted some neighbouring countries, the vi-



giance of administration has preserved our territory from it; it is rapidly diminishing in those places where it exercised its ravages. In maintaining the measures which are still dictated by prudence and a regard for the public health, the introduction of the evil will be prevented, without interrupting the communication necessary for the aliment of our commerce and of our manufactures.—In the centre of La Vendée a new city is building, intended to be the seat of the administration. From thence it will exercise over every point an active and sure superintendence; from thence knowledge and sound principles will be propagated throughout that department in which ignorance and the want of instruction have so frequently delivered over simple and honest minds to the intrigues of malevolence.—Decrees of the Emperor have recalled commerce to the left bank of the Rhine, and bestowed, on Mentz and Cologne, all the advantages of real emporiums, without the danger of introducing contraband goods into the interior of France.—Manufactures are improving; and whilst in vain declamations, mercenaries paid by the British government boast its distant and precarious resources dispersed over the seas and the Indies; whilst they describe our workshops as deserted and our workmen dying with misery, our industry extends its roots over our own soil, repels English industry far from our frontiers, and has succeeded in equalling it, in what formed its glory and its success, the perfection of its machines, and is preparing to dispute with it consumers in every place where it can meet with and reach it.—Our first manufacture, agriculture, has enlarged and become clear—a system of exportation, in such a manner combined, that it shuts and opens according to our wants, assures to the husbandman the price of his labour, and abundance to our markets. New encouragements prepare the improvement of the race of our horses, our wools are meliorated, our fields are covered with cattle, and throughout every part of the empire its true riches multiply.—Aided by riches, renewed security has given a freer scope to active beneficence: excited by religion, and by the recollection of our misfortunes, the latter is not limited to charities of the moment; it embraces the future, and trusts its treasure to government, which guarantees to it an employment conformable to its wishes. Never have so many legacies and pious donations been made in favour of the hospitals, and of the establishments of beneficence. Some of these institutions have been created or re-established by private persons; never has suffering hu-

manity found more friends, nor indigence more succour. They are distributed with as much wisdom as zeal, and the hospitals of Paris directed with an intelligence which multiplies the cares in economising the funds, relieve all wants, cure many evils, and are no more those murderous asylums which devour their numerous and miserable population. The number of the indigent of the capital is accordingly thirty-two thousand below that which it was in 1791, and twenty-five thousand less than that which it was in the year 10.—Religion has resumed its empire; it no longer exercises itself but for the good of humanity; a wise tolerance accompanies it, and the ministers of different forms of worship, who adore the same God, do honour to themselves by testimonies of reciprocal respect, and know no other rivalry than that of virtues.—Such is our position within; without, French courage, seconded by Spanish good faith, has preserved to us St. Domingo; Martinique braves the menaces of our enemies, and, under a paternal government renders stronger and more durable the ties which attach it to the mother-country.—Guadaloupe has enriched itself with the spoils of British commerce, and Guyana continues to prosper under an active and vigorous administration.—The isles of France and of Re-union would be at the present day the emporium of the riches of Asia; London would be in convulsions and despair, had not inexperience or weakness baffled a scheme most ably concerted. The isles of France and of Re-union, however, are still enriched with the prizes which we have taken from our enemies.—Our armies are always deserving of their reputation. With the same valour and the same discipline, they have acquired that patience which waits for opportunities without murmuring, and confides in the prudence and designs of the Chief who conducts them. Our soldiers, our officers, learn to govern the element which separates them from that island, the grand object of their resentment. Their audacity and their address astonish the oldest and the most experienced mariners.—Our fleets, by continual manœuvres, lead the way to combats; and whilst those of our enemies wear out in striving against winds and tempests, ours learn without destroying themselves to fight against them.—In fine, since by the war we have gained Hanover, we are more in a state than ever to strike decisive blows against our enemies. Our navy is in a better state than it has been for these ten years past; upon land, our army is more numerous, better disciplined,



and better provided with every thing calculated to ensure victory than it ever was. —In the department of finances, the same activity prevails in the receipts, the same regularity in the management, the same order in the administration of the treasure; and almost always the same stability in the value of the public debt. —The war in the first instance necessitated extraordinary expenses, but the funds for them were expended in our own soil, and have given us vessels, ports, and every thing which is necessary for the development of our forces against our enemies. —These extraordinary expenses have now ceased, and those exacted by our war-like attitude will henceforth be directed by an economy which the urgency of our preparations for attack and defence did not admit of. —The revenues of the crown will support all the expenses of the coronation, and those still demanded by the splendour of the throne. The lustre which surrounds it will never be a burden to the nation. —The situation of Europe has experienced but one important change. —Spain reposed under a neutrality to which France had consented, and which the British cabinet had acknowledged; her vessels were suddenly attacked, and the treaty of Amiens was violated with regard to her as it had previously been with regard to France. His Catholic Majesty has taken the part commanded him by the dignity of his throne, by good faith outraged, and by the honour of a generous people whose destinies he directs. —The Emperor of Austria devotes to the restoration of his finances, the prosperity of his provinces, the progress of their commerce, that repose prompted by the frankness of his character and the interest of his subjects. —The Italian republic, administered, and governed by the same principles as France, requires, like that power, a definitive organization, which shall insure to the present generation, and to future generations, all the advantages of the social pact. United to this republic by the duties imposed on him, both as president and as founder of that state, the Emperor will reply to the confidence it testifies towards him, and insure its destinies and its independence, by serving the interests of the French people, to whom also it owes its existence, and by conciliating the interests of these two friendly nations with the well understood interests of the neighbouring powers. By the changes called for by the will of a nation and by the interest of all, absurd calumnies will fall to

the ground, and France, who has herself erected barriers where she had fixed her limits, will no longer be accused of a wish to overleap them. —Helvetia enjoys in peace the benefits of her constitution, of the wisdom of her citizens, and of our alliance. —Batavia still groans under an oligarchical government, without union in its views, without patriotism and without vigour. Its colonies have been a second time sold and delivered up to England, without firing a gun; but this nation possesses energy, morals, and economy; it wants only a firm, patriotic, and enlightened government. —The King of Prussia has shown himself, upon every occasion, the friend of France, and the Emperor has profited of every one which has presented itself, to consolidate this happy harmony. —The Electors and all the Members of the Germanic Body faithfully maintain the relations of benevolence and friendship which unite it to France. —Denmark follows the counsels of a wise, moderate and judicious policy. —The spirit of Catherine the Great will watch over the councils of Alexander I.; he will recollect that the friendship of France is a necessary counterpoise for him in the balance of Europe, that, placed at a distance from her, he can neither attain nor disturb her repose, and that his great interest is to find in his relations with her, a necessary vent for the productions of his empire. —Turkey is wavering in her politics; she follows, through fear, a system which her interest disavows. —May she never learn at the expense of her own existence, that fear and irresolution accelerate the fall of empires, a thousand times more fatal than the dangers and losses of an unfortunate war. —Whatever may be the movements of England, the destinies of France are fixed: strong in her union, strong in her riches and in the courage of her defenders, she will faithfully cultivate the alliance of her friends, and will not act so as either to deserve enemies nor fear them. —When England shall be convinced of the impotence of her efforts to agitate the Continent; when she shall know that she has only to lose in a war without either end or motives; when she shall be convinced that France will never accept any other conditions than those of Amiens, and will never consent to leave to her the right of breaking treaties at pleasure, by appropriating Malta—England will then have arrived at pacific sentiments. Hatred and envy have but their day."